Ask Our Economists

>>  Intro:

Welcome to the Wells Fargo, Ask Our Economists podcast series, where we explore what's on our clients’ minds, provide timely commentary on what's happening in the markets and discuss our outlook for the ever-changing investment landscape. Our economists provide their views on the latest domestic and global trends, insights on the demographics, social issues and challenges that impact our world, all which help you manage risk and capture opportunities. Join us as we take you down the road of navigating today's economic climate with confidence.

>> Jay Bryson:

Hello, I'm Jay Bryson, chief economist for Wells Fargo's Corporate and Investment Bank. And you're listening to the Ask Our Economists podcast series. Recently, there's been a lot of developments going on in China that seems to have everyone's attention. So in order to talk about this on this podcast today, we've brought in Brendan McKenna, one of our international economists who specializes in China and other emerging sort of economies, to kind of walk us through it. So Brendan, let’s try to level set here. What's going on in China right now, particularly with the property sector? And you know, how serious do you think it all is?

>> Brendan Mckenna:

Thanks, Jay. You're absolutely right. As far as China kind of grasping attention of the financial markets and economists like ourselves. And it really does kind of come back to the property sector. And I should caveat that by saying that the real estate and kind of property sector challenges in China have been somewhat persistent and kind of evident for an extended period of time. Now, these property sector challenges have intensified recently, and that's kind of why we're gathering together to talk about it now. But as a little bit of a back story. You know, in short, China's property sector and the property developers and the real estate firms within China are really just over-leveraged and they carry too much debt. And now that we're starting to see China's economy decelerate and decelerate pretty quickly and the cost of living in China rise, real estate purchases have slowed and slowed pretty dramatically. And a lot of these property developers just aren't generating enough cash flows to actually repay the debt that they've taken on and actually service all of that debt that they've carried over the last couple of years or so. So we haven't really seen a lot of these property developers pay back those debts, and that's led to bond defaults and bankruptcies and some very close calls as far as many property developers on the brink of collapsing or not. And probably a couple of years ago, the biggest property developer in China named Evergrande really through these challenges back into the spotlight. But just recently, we've also seen some other large property developers such as Country Garden. There was a real estate investment trust that missed payments recently. So some of these larger issues are starting to come back onto the forefront and it's certainly been a very big problem that China's economy is facing that's having ripple effects around the global financial markets right now.

>> Jay Bryson:

Okay. So, you know, that's all really interesting. You’ve got a bunch of property developers who have maybe a little bit too much debt. But I guess the question at the end of the day is what sort of effects could this have on the Chinese economy? And, you know, clearly, I would think policymakers in China, obviously are aware of the problems. I mean, is there anything that policymakers there can do?

>> Brendan Mckenna:

That's a great question, Jay. And the answer to that question actually goes back to the global financial crisis in 2008-2009, where Chinese authorities and the Chinese government actually used real estate and infrastructure development to spark and spur economic growth over the course of the global downturn. And what that actually did was make real estate a very important part of China's economy. So by some estimates, close to 30% of China's economy comes from real estate development, property development and kind of the spillover industries as it relates to real estate related activities. So if China’s property sector does decelerate and decelerate sharply, you could actually see a pretty significant impact on China's economy, not only in the short term, but maybe over the longer term as well. But to put some numbers on that, over the course of this year, we've been pretty consistently revising our GDP growth forecasts for China's economy lower. And just recently, we took additional action and we took our 2023 annual GDP forecast down from 5.2% to 4.8%, which is a relatively large downward revision. But it also implies that China's economy is probably not going to achieve the official growth target laid out by the Chinese government at the beginning of this year. And again, just kind of combined with some of the other structural issues that China's economy is facing, like aging demographics, additional debt problems in other sectors of the economy, you know, the real estate sector issues that we're facing now are certainly going to push China's growth prospects over the longer term, much lower than they were or what we saw historically. Now, as far as what can policymakers do about it, there's actually little that can be done at the moment. And I say that because we have a debt problem. If you're going to deploy fiscal stimulus, that's likely going to add to that debt problem. And that's something that the Chinese government and Chinese authorities have been looking to protect against. So on the fiscal stimulus side, there's little that's been done to this point. And then there's also a willingness to not do as much on the fiscal support side, which really places the burden of economic support on the people's Bank of China and monetary policy. And there has been some action taken by the PBOC. We've seen lending rates come down. We've seen policy rate cuts, we've seen reserve requirement ratios for banks also be lowered. But as of right now, those actions from the monetary policy side have probably done little to offset the property sector slowdown and some of the other challenges that China's economy is facing. So the policymakers are certainly aware of the problems, but there's actually little that can be done. And there's also somewhat of a lack of willingness to actually meaningfully address these challenges. So, Jay, I want to turn it back over to you. And you've actually done some work on maybe what a China hard landing crisis would look like for the US economy. You recently wrote a report that kind of focuses on this issue. Can you talk a little bit about your analysis and kind of what you uncovered during that project?

>> Jay Bryson:

Sure, Brendan. So as you mentioned, what we wanted to do is try to figure out what this would mean for not only the US economy, but some other major economies around the world, like the Eurozone and Japan. And so, you know, at the end of the day, nobody really knows how bad this is going to be. So we decided we wanted to mimic or benchmark something that was, you know, pretty significant. And so we went back, we looked at history. And what we did is we looked at the 1989 to 1991 period in China. And so if you go back to the 1980s with the opening of China that started in the early 1980s, the Chinese economy was growing very quickly, robustly over that decade. We got to 1989, and some listeners may remember that's when Tiananmen Square happened. And so there was a lot of sanctions that were put in place after that. And the Chinese economy decelerated rapidly. And so what we did was we said, okay, so let's try to mimic that. And so when we when we did the math, what we found out, if we looked at the trend in the 1980s and we said, so if the Chinese economy would have continued to grow at that trend rate between 1989 and 1991, when that economy really slowed down sharply. If it would have continued to grow at the previous growth rate, it would have been about 12% larger at the end of 1991 than what it actually was. And so then we what we did, we said, okay, we're going to use that now as our benchmark. Not that that's necessarily going to happen, but we're just going to use that as a benchmark. And we have a we have a model, we've got a baseline. And we say, okay, so take this baseline. And now let's say the economy is 12% smaller. Another way to say that is, you know, the economy would be 12% less large three years from now than it otherwise would be. And just to put that into perspective, that's a pretty nasty shock. So it's just, you know, if you think about the US economy back during the financial crisis, if you take the trend growth rate between 2001 and 2007 and project that out for three years, then you look what actually happened. Because of the financial crisis, the US economy was 9% smaller than it otherwise would be. And you know, the financial crisis here in the United States was pretty nasty. And so we're looking at 12% in China. So again, that's a pretty meaningful downturn.

>> Brendan Mckenna:

Yeah, absolutely. Sounds like a really in-depth analysis and it sounds like you did some really great benchmarking work. But can you actually put some numbers to it? How bad would the effect of kind of this China hard landing crises in this type of scenario that you laid out the for the US economy?

>> Jay Bryson:

So going into it, you know, I would have thought, you know, you look at that big shock in the Chinese economy and that would have, I would have thought, maybe some pretty significant effects here in the United States and some other major economies as well. And it turns out and we employ this global macro model to do that and we put these numbers through for China. It turns out in terms of GDP, it slows GDP growth here in the United States but it’s not like it causes a recession. And the same thing in Europe and Japan. You know, on average, it reduces growth in those three economies over the next three years by, you know, in some cases a quarter of a percentage point, in some cases a half a percentage point. But it's relatively, relatively slow. And, you know, that's really interesting. And when you sit back and you think about it a little bit, it does take does make a little bit of sense. If you look at the United States as an example. So last year, we exported $150 billion to China. Okay. That's, that's a big number, right? But in seen in the context of the size of the US economy, which is $26 trillion, it amounts to roughly a half a percent of GDP. It's just not all that much. And then, yes, you know, if you have a big, you know, slowdown in China, it's going to have spillover effects on the rest of the world. But if you know again, looking at the United States, our exports as a percent of our GDP is only a roughly 10% or so. It's a relatively small number. And what else is going on here, we found out through the model is because of this big deceleration in China, causes oil prices to come down about $15 a barrel, roughly 20% from their baseline values. So that brings down inflation in the United States. That gives people more disposable income. So you kind of have these offsets going on as well. Now, you know, again, when I think about it as an economist, sometimes you have to take these numbers you get from models with a little bit of a grain of salt. And, you know, I would say maybe, you know, if we're looking at this big major downturn in China, that the effects on the US economy may be a little bit more than what our, you know, quantitative model would suggest. You know, if you have a big downturn in China, I would think, you know, stock markets around the world would take a little bit of a hit. Corporate bond spreads would probably push out somewhat. Generally, you get some financial tightening going on and that may, you know, increase the effects on the US economy. But at the end of the day, again, even with this real big downturn in China, it's probably not going to cause a recession in the United States. Yes. Does it slow growth? Yeah, for sure. But does it cause a major disaster here in the United States? The answer is probably no. And then just one other sort of thing. You know, when I talked about the financial crisis earlier before, if you go back 15 years ago, U.S. debt was held widely around the world, mortgage-backed securities held widely around the world. You know, lots of bank debt around the world. China just doesn't have the same sort of financial linkages with the rest of the world that the United States does, and did 15 years ago. So a hard landing in China, if one were to occur, would certainly slow the global economy. But it probably wouldn't be another global financial sort of crisis. But, you know, this is something obviously we're going to keep an eye on. Brendan, I think you would agree with me. These developments in the Chinese property sector aren't going away anytime soon and it's something that's out there and we'll continue to keep an eye on. And as our analysis changes, will keep you all updated. But again, thank you very much for joining us today. Thank you for the questions that you continue to submit to us to give us ideas for these podcasts. And we wish you all a good day. Thank you.

>>Outro:

That’s all for this episode of the Ask Our Economists podcast and we thank you for joining us. If you enjoyed today’s episode, please share with colleagues, family, friends, and anyone who listens to podcasts. If you have any economic related questions or topics you would like to hear about in an upcoming episode, please email us at askoureconomists@wellsfargo.com. Ask Our Economists is produced by Wells Fargo.

>>Disclosures:

This podcast should not be copied, distributed, published, or reproduced, in whole or in part. 

The views expressed on this podcast represent the opinions of the authors on prospective trends in the domestic markets and the financial institutions industry and is intended for global financial institutions partners and customers, and other market participants who are customers of Wells Fargo. The views expressed within are not intended as a recommendation offer or solicitation with respect to the purchase or sale of any security or other financial product nor does it constitute professional advice. The views and opinions expressed are also not necessarily those of Wells Fargo and may differ from the views and opinions of other departments or divisions of Wells Fargo. Wells Fargo does not make any representation or warranty, express or implied, as to the accuracy or completeness of the statements or any information expressed within this podcast and any liability therefore (including in respect of direct, indirect, or consequential loss or damage) is expressly disclaimed.

We do not guarantee this information but have obtained it from sources we believe to be reliable. Opinions expressed are based on our experience and judgment as of this recording and are subject to change without notice. For the latest views of the Wells Fargo Economics team, please visit www.wellsfargo.com/cib/insights/economics. 

This is not an offer to sell or to buy any security or foreign currency. Any past performance discussed during this podcast is no guarantee of future results. Any forward-looking statements or forecasts are based on assumptions and actual results may vary from any such statements or forecasts.

Any indices referenced are for performance comparison are unmanaged and cannot be invested into directly. As always please remember investing involves risk and possible loss of principal capital; please seek advice from your licensed professionals.

All price references and market forecasts are as of the date of recording. 

Wells Fargo Corporate & Investment Banking (CIB) and Wells Fargo Securities (WFS) are the trade names used for the corporate banking, capital markets, and investment banking services of Wells Fargo & Company and its subsidiaries, including but not limited to Wells Fargo Securities, LLC, member of NYSE, FINRA, NFA, and SIPC, Wells Fargo Prime Services, LLC, member of FINRA, NFA and SIPC, and Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., member NFA and swap dealer registered with the CFTC and security-based swap dealer registered with the SEC, member FDIC.  Wells Fargo Securities, LLC and Wells Fargo Prime Services, LLC, are distinct entities from affiliated banks and thrifts.

>>  Intro:

Welcome to the Wells Fargo, Ask Our Economists podcast series, where we explore what's on our clients minds, provide timely commentary on what's happening in the markets and discuss our outlook for the ever-changing investment landscape. Our economists provide their views on the latest domestic and global trends, insights on the demographics, social issues and challenges that impact our world, all which help you manage risk and capture opportunities. Join us as we take you down the road of navigating today's economic climate with confidence.

>> Jay Bryson:

Hello, I'm Jay Bryson, chief economist of the Corporate and Investment Bank at Wells Fargo. And you're listening to our Ask Our Economists podcast series. And today, I'm joined by senior economist Michael Pugliese to talk about some recent debt downgrades of US sovereign debt. So, Mike, as you well know, recently Fitch, which is one of the three major rating agencies, downgraded U.S. debt to sovereign debt from its highest rating, AAA to a AA+. And as some listeners may recall, this happened back in 2011 at the time of the debt ceiling debate. At that time, when Standard and Poor’s downgraded us. And so now it's been 12 years and just one more rating agency of the major ones. Moody's still has U.S. sovereign debt on AAA status, although it is on a negative watch. So, Mike, let's talk about that downgrade. Why did Fitch do it and was it expected or not? 

>>Michael Pugliese:

Yeah, So I think in order to understand the downgrade, it's important to start a little bit with how we got here on the fiscal front over the course of the pandemic. So pre-pandemic at the end of 2019, the US debt to GDP ratio for the federal government was about 79%. So the national debt was about 79% of the US economy. And then when the pandemic struck, that skyrocketed. As a result of the economic damage from the pandemic and all of the fiscal aid that the federal government adopted to support the economy. So that same ratio went from 79% before the pandemic to a little over 100% in the second quarter of 2020 at the peak of the pandemic. But over the last few years, that's actually declined a little bit. So the federal government's debt to GDP ratio has fallen down to 93% around the start of this year. But more recently, that started to turn. It increased in the second quarter. And I think as we get data for the third quarter and the fourth quarter and into next year, you're going to start to see that increase again. And that was one of the two things that Fitch cited, was a deterioration in the medium-term fiscal outlook. Some of this for known reasons we've already been talking about for years, an aging population, rising health care costs, pressuring entitlement spending, but also some new things in terms of new spending initiatives, higher interest costs, normalizing revenues after they surged during the pandemic. And the second thing Fitch cited as a reason for its downgrade was sort of deteriorating governance as a result of the most recent debt ceiling fight and just the recurrence of these debt ceiling disputes, government shutdowns and some of the other sort of budget challenges the US government has had for really more than a decade now. To your point, Jay, the last downgrade happening in 2011 when that debt ceiling debate was going on. So I think the downgrade was unexpected. There have not been a lot of these over history. So certainly was not something that markets or analysts were looking for. But I think you can kind of see between the governance side and this shift on the fiscal front at least a little bit why it may have happened now and not say, you know, a year ago or three or four years ago.

>> Jay Bryson:

Okay. So you just said something kind of interesting there. You said that markets kind of, you know, were a little bit surprised and taken aback, you know, whatever. You know, I would think that, you know, if you downgrade someone's debt, that they're probably going to see higher interest cost on that. So, I mean, have we seen a major impact, particularly on the Treasury market? Are we looking at higher yields? Does the US government now have to pay more for its debt because of this downgrade?

>>Michael Pugliese:

So I think financial markets reacted a little bit to the downgrade, but certainly nothing major or material. So when you look at risk assets like equities, they were down a bit over the course of the following day or two after the downgrade, but certainly nothing calamitous. And same in the Treasury market where you saw yields in particularly longer-term yields rise a bit over the following couple of days. But one, it wasn't a whole lot. We're talking ten or 20 basis points over those next few days. And two, I'm not even entirely sure that was solely due to the downgrade. So I don't want to say there was no financial market reaction. But you know, we're not talking about a world where the credit downgrade happened on the federal government and yields doubled or something along those lines. It was a fairly small and muted reaction across really all markets, but also definitely the Treasury market as well. 

>> Jay Bryson:

Thanks for that. So I'm going to say something that may sound a little bit controversial at least to some of our listeners here, and it's not the level of debt per se that is potentially problematic. I mean, you think about it, right? You know, a very large corporation can sustain a large amount of debt relative to a smaller sort of one. So it's really, it’s not the level of debt per se, but it's the say, the inability to service that debt to make the interest and the amortization payments on that debt. That's what gets, you know, not only individuals and corporations into problems, but, you know, potentially, you know, a government as well. So, you know, with that in mind, can you talk a little bit on the ability of the US government to service its debt? How much is interest as we pay as a percent either of the federal budget or maybe as a percent of GDP? I mean can you put all that into context for us, what's the ability to service that debt?

>>Michael Pugliese:

Yeah, so what I would say on that front Jay is over the 2010s, what we saw was much higher debt burdens than had been the case in previous decades for the federal government, but actually lower interest spending. So even though the debt to GDP ratio more than doubled between 2007 and 2019, you saw interest spending that as a share of the economy really didn't do a whole lot of anything in terms of rising or falling as a result of much lower rates over the course of the 2010s. So to put it in perspective, interest spending as a share of GDP was about 1.7% at the end of 2019. Now, more recently, that started to shift. So right now, interest spending as a share of the economy for the federal government is about 2.5%. So it's clearly gone up. Now, is that a particularly worrisome level? I would say no right now. We've seen those interest spending as a share of GDP levels before. Throughout the 1980s and much of the 1990s, it was sort of around 3%, you know, 3.25% somewhere around then. So, you know, we're not even at the highs we've seen in relatively recent history. But I do think the trend is concerning because the longer-term fiscal outlook is very sensitive to interest rate assumptions. So if we're going to have a ten year yield that's 4% on a go forward basis like it is right now, over the next 5 to 10 years, that's double what it was roughly on, say in, 2019 or so. And so, you know, I don't think of it so much as what is the interest burden at the moment, but are we looking at a world where interest rates are going to be a lot higher over the next decade than they were in the previous decade? And is that going to have this compounding impact? When you look at the Congressional Budget Office's forecast, so CBO is kind of one of the top fiscal analyst groups in D.C. And when you look at their sort of longer term projections, they've got interest spending as a share of GDP at about 3.6%, 3.7% in a decade from now. And that's assuming a ten year yield of about 3.8% over the longer run, which isn't all that far from where we are today. And that would be a very high share of GDP in terms of interest spending if we actually realized those numbers higher than what we saw in the 1980s and 1990s and certainly higher than we're seeing today. So when I think about can the federal Government carry this interest burden for now, I think the answer is absolutely. It's really not something I'm all that concerned about at the moment. But I think it does certainly open the question of where will we be five, ten years down the road If you see yields at these levels that are sustained not just for the next 12 months, but say, for the next ten years or so, that puts a much bigger sort of fiscal squeeze on the federal government than was the case in much of the 2010s when rates were a lot lower.

>> Jay Bryson:

So to sum that up, Mike, it sounds like you're not overly concerned about the ability of the US government to service its debt right now, but isn't there you know, I'll call it an opportunity cost in some sense, right? If you're, if the government is paying more to service its debt, even though it can service it, if it's paying more to service its debt, isn't that going to potentially squeeze other parts of the budget? Right. Maybe you won't be able to spend as much on, I don't know, the military or you won't be able to spend as much on building roads or something like that. So, you know, can you talk a little bit about where interest as a percent of the budget is right now? And maybe put that into historical context as well?

>>Michael Pugliese:

Yeah. So, you know, pre-pandemic again, just kind of using this pre and post pandemic baseline, interest spending as a share of the federal budget was 8%, maybe a little bit over 8%. And now it's up to 10%, a little over 10% and rising. Right. That's headed higher again, as I already noted, in the coming quarters. And so you're up to about $0.10 on the dollar of federal government spending is going towards just servicing the debt. And exactly to your point Jay, you know, that can crowd out other forms of spending depending on the fiscal policies that Congress and the White House adopt on a go forward basis, whether that's defense spending, as you mentioned, or other investment initiatives or money transfer payment programs that the federal government runs because the deficit is pretty big right now. It's now trending towards somewhere between 6% and 7% as a share of GDP, which is unusually large for an economy that's pretty good. With unemployment at about 3.5%, growth is hanging in okay. And I think this is really where the concern came from for Fitch in terms of if you're running deficits this big in good times, what will that look like a few years down the road? If rates are still pretty high, there's potentially a recession on the horizon in 2024. You know, all these different factors kind of layered on the governance issues. And I think you can see why at least from Fitch's view, the downgrade was warranted. So maybe kicking it over to you then, Jay, we've talked a little bit about the short-term outlook for interest spending and the fiscal outlook more broadly.

We’ve talked about the market reaction. What about longer run, right? I mean, do you have any concerns about sort of a longer run, maybe this downgrade or the fiscal deterioration more broadly plays into the U.S. losing its role as the world's reserve currency? 

>> Jay Bryson:

Yeah. So I guess, like you, Mike, you know, I'm not overly concerned about things here in the short term, you know, maybe in the long run. But, you know, here in the short term, I don't think it really has any major impact. I mean, at the end of the day, the market for U.S. Treasury securities is the deepest, most liquid, most transparent financial market in the world. Treasury securities serves as collateral for trillions and trillions and trillions of dollars of other financial sort of transactions. And the long and the short of it is there's just no substitute for U.S. Treasury securities. You know, people talk about Europe or the Eurozone. Well, if you think about it, the Eurozone is a collection of, you know, 19 or so, you know, sovereign countries. Spanish or Portuguese government bonds are just not the same as German government bonds. And the German government bond market, although it's one of the best in the world in terms of ratings it's just nowhere close in terms of size to the U.S. Treasury market. You know, Japan has its own set of long-term fiscal challenges. And then there's also China. But I’d mention the word transparency in terms of the U.S. That's certainly not really the case when it comes to Chinese financial markets. So, you know, in the near term, I don't worry about a downgrade like this affecting the status of the U.S. dollar in terms of its reserve currency status. You know, maybe if you and I are having this conversation ten, 15, 20 years from now and things have gotten even worse and worse then maybe. But, you know, again, right now, again, there's just no substitute for U.S. Treasury securities. So I'm just not overly concerned about that. Mike, let me let me ask you a follow up question. You know, what's to be done here? Are we just going to have to wallow in continuous downgrades going forward? I mean, is there a way out of all of this? 

>>Michael Pugliese:

You know, what I would say is that if there's good news here, it's that it's not just that the U.S. Treasury market is the world's deepest and most liquid and backing that world’s reserve currency. The United States also has the world's largest and most diversified economy. It produces $27 trillion of annual GDP per year and growing. Household net worth in the United States is more than $140 trillion at present. And Fitch actually noted in its in its credit downgrade that a possible catalyst for an upgrade in the future could be either bringing mandatory spending in line with current revenues as a share of GDP or alternatively bringing revenues in line and up to fund these sort of commitments on the spending front on a go forward basis. So whether policy makers will adopt one of those paths or a mix of the two or neither remains to be seen. But a medium-term fiscal adjustment to kind of meet those fiscal realities would certainly be something that I think could be a positive catalyst on the fiscal front for a future upgrade and to alleviate some of these challenges and concerns we've talked about over the course of our discussion here today.

>> Jay Bryson:

Well, thanks, Mike, and thanks for the discussion today. Obviously, these issues won't get solved here in the near term, but maybe as you mentioned in the medium term, maybe there's a solution there. But thanks, Mike, for joining us today. And thank you all for listening and thank you for the questions that you continue to submit to us for this series. Thank you very much for joining us today.

>>Outro:

That’s all for this episode of the Ask Our Economists podcast and we thank you for joining us. If you enjoyed today’s episode, please share with colleagues, family, friends, and anyone who listens to podcasts. If you have any economic related questions or topics you would like to hear about in an upcoming episode, please email us at askoureconomists@wellsfargo.com. Ask Our Economists is produced by Wells Fargo.

>>Disclosures:

This podcast should not be copied, distributed, published, or reproduced, in whole or in part. 

The views expressed on this podcast represent the opinions of the authors on prospective trends in the domestic markets and the financial institutions industry and is intended for global financial institutions partners and customers, and other market participants who are customers of Wells Fargo. The views expressed within are not intended as a recommendation offer or solicitation with respect to the purchase or sale of any security or other financial product nor does it constitute professional advice. The views and opinions expressed are also not necessarily those of Wells Fargo and may differ from the views and opinions of other departments or divisions of Wells Fargo. Wells Fargo does not make any representation or warranty, express or implied, as to the accuracy or completeness of the statements or any information expressed within this podcast and any liability therefore (including in respect of direct, indirect, or consequential loss or damage) is expressly disclaimed.

We do not guarantee this information but have obtained it from sources we believe to be reliable. Opinions expressed are based on our experience and judgment as of this recording and are subject to change without notice. For the latest views of the Wells Fargo Economics team, please visit www.wellsfargo.com/cib/insights/economics. 

This is not an offer to sell or to buy any security or foreign currency. Any past performance discussed during this podcast is no guarantee of future results. Any forward-looking statements or forecasts are based on assumptions and actual results may vary from any such statements or forecasts.

Any indices referenced are for performance comparison are unmanaged and cannot be invested into directly. As always please remember investing involves risk and possible loss of principal capital; please seek advice from your licensed professionals.

All price references and market forecasts are as of the date of recording. 

Wells Fargo Corporate & Investment Banking (CIB) and Wells Fargo Securities (WFS) are the trade names used for the corporate banking, capital markets, and investment banking services of Wells Fargo & Company and its subsidiaries, including but not limited to Wells Fargo Securities, LLC, member of NYSE, FINRA, NFA, and SIPC, Wells Fargo Prime Services, LLC, member of FINRA, NFA and SIPC, and Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., member NFA and swap dealer registered with the CFTC and security-based swap dealer registered with the SEC, member FDIC.  Wells Fargo Securities, LLC and Wells Fargo Prime Services, LLC, are distinct entities from affiliated banks and thrifts.

>>  Intro:

Welcome to the Wells Fargo, Ask Our Economist podcast series, where we explore what's on our clients minds. Provide timely commentary on what's happening in the markets and discuss our outlook for the ever-changing investment landscape. Our economists provide their views on the latest domestic and global trends, insights on the demographics, social issues and challenges that impact our world, all which help you manage risk and capture opportunities. Join us as we take you down the road of navigating today's economic climate with confidence.

>> Jay Bryson:

Hello, I'm Jay Bryson, chief economist for Wells Fargo's Corporate and Investment bank. And you're listening to the Ask Our Economists podcast series. So recently there's been a lot of discussion about commercial real estate and what sort of effects it may have. So we've invited our expert on commercial real estate, Charlie Dougherty, here, to try to kind of make sense of all of this. So, Charlie, let's just start and kind of a level set so people talk about commercial real estate, but that's really a broad category, right? There's lots of different sort of subcategories of CRE. So can you kind of put it in perspective, talk about some of these different subcategories?

>> >> Charlie Dougherty:

Sure thing, Jay. Yes. So the CRE market is a fairly sizable part of the overall U.S. economy. So just to put a number on it, the total commercial real estate market was valued at roughly $24 trillion at the end of 2022. So just to give you some additional perspective there, consider that the value of residential real estate on household balance sheets is roughly $41 trillion. So not quite as big as the residential market, but still big considering nominal GDP in the U.S. economy was about $26 trillion in 2022. So the CRE market is large, but certainly not a monolith. As you mentioned, there's a wide array of different asset classes. So of that $24 trillion, the multifamily market is about 22% of that. So that's everything from garden or low rise, high rise apartment buildings. Then you have industrial buildings and that’s about 12% of the total. That's your warehouses, distribution facilities, assortment centers, manufacturing buildings, etc. Then you have office and retail. That's also about 12% of the total market. And by the way, retail isn't just malls, it's convenience stores, department stores, strip centers, town centers and so forth. Then you have hospitality, which is a smaller slice at about 3%. And that's, of course, hotels and motels. They have a bunch of other property categories like health care, sports, data centers and other specialty buildings that don't really cleanly fit into any of those sectors that I just mentioned, but nevertheless make up a significant chunk of the overall market.

>> Jay Bryson:

Well great. Well thanks for that. In sum, it just sounds like there's lots of different segments here of the CRE market kind of spread out into all those different ones. And again, the office space where I think most of the I guess maybe concerns are because of return to work and things like that, the office space is, I think you said roughly about 12% of that total, which again is roughly $24 trillion or so. So before we get to office, let's talk about some of those other sectors of the CRE market. Are there any there that you may be particularly concerned about?

>> >> Charlie Dougherty:

Yes. Well, I mean, broadly speaking, CRE fundamentals have moderated recently as interest rates have moved higher. So generally across the board you have higher vacancy rates, slower rent growth, but some sectors have outperformed. And I think that is in large part due to this overall resilient pace of consumer spending that we've seen over the past few years. So, for example, if you take a look at the hotel sector, revenge travel coming out of the pandemic has boosted occupancy rates to just about below where they were before COVID. Daily rates asking daily rates on rooms have also moved even higher. So moving forward, if you think about the gradual return of business and international travel is going to continue, that should help keep demand relatively strong. If you look at retail, the strength of the U.S. consumer has been really apparent in the retail market and demand has been really solid over the past few years despite higher e-commerce usage. So, of course, you know, malls remain this area of stress, but new supply in total in the retail market has been really slow over the past decade, and that has led to vacancy rates actually remaining quite low. Now, thinking ahead, consumer spending here, especially for goods, if that slows down, as we currently expect, that could mean further moderation in terms of retail demand is on the horizon. A similar thing can be said for industrial. Industrial is one area where we have seen a lot of new construction. Even so, demand it looks like it's holding up better thanks to things like e-commerce integration, expanding domestic manufacturing capacity. Supply chain fortification. So demand for industrial is downshifting but remaining quite resilient. Then you turn to the multifamily market and apartment demand has certainly softened compared to recent years, but so far in 2023 it’s looking like it's starting to normalize a little bit. So on the supply side, there is a lot of new apartment supply that's on the way. So there are close to 1 million units that are currently under construction, and that's the most since the early 1970s. So that wave of new supply may push up vacancy rates moving forward. That said, on the single family side, inventories remain remarkably low. Mortgage rates are relatively high. And I think those actually could be tailwinds for the apartment market moving forward.

>> Jay Bryson:

Okay. So, you know, maybe some stress here and there, but generally, it doesn't sound like anything really, you know, systemic there in those different parts of the CRE market. But let's focus now on offices. You know, that's again, where I guess a lot of the I'll call it angst may be in terms of the office market. Again, because of return to office, work from home, whatever you want to call it. What are your thoughts there, Charlie, about how is the outlook for the office market in CRE?

>> >> Charlie Dougherty:

Yeah, I think those concerns are certainly warranted. The office market is clearly under a bit of stress at the moment. If you look at the impacts of hybrid work, it's resulted in office vacancy rates that are moving higher. And given the substantial amount of sublease space that's currently on the market, you know, vacancy rates are probably going to move even higher. So we have a marked increase in supply, lower demand following the pandemic. That being said, I mean, it's it's important to not paint with too broad a brush. There's a bit of regional variation, meaning office vacancy rates are pretty much elevated across the nation. But the magnitude of the increase that we've seen recently has differed. So, for example, San Francisco has seen a sharp rise in vacancy rates while South Florida has fared a little bit better. The type of office building actually also matters. So if you look at new office space, new office space, that's a little bit more suitable for culture building, mentorship, virtual activities, space that's environmentally friendly in amenity rich buildings and desirable part of town. That type of office space is actually been a little bit more resilient and should continue to be more resilient to impacts stemming from the rise of remote work. Now, the economic cycle could also impact office demand moving forward. Return to office has been lagging, but more workers are getting called back into the office, and slower economic growth could actually encourage managers to call more workers back more of the time in order to boost productivity. All that being said, there's a lot of office space that's available and that's going to be weighing on the market for the foreseeable future. I will say that the retail market actually experienced a similar disruption with e-commerce. And over time, that market adjusted. So you had supply slowing down until, you know, the next iteration of retail demand emerged. So we can probably expect the same thing to happen in the office market. On that note, there is some potential for redevelopment of office space to things like residential, retail or lab space or warehouses. And while this is certainly intriguing, I think this is, I think, very challenging to accomplish given the differing building codes, zoning limitations and just generally higher costs for things like material labor and especially financing. But overall, in the office market, we have high supply, low demand, and that's likely to weigh on office market fundamentals moving forward, although over time, I think the market should adjust. So, Jay, let me ask you, you know, this moderation that we've seen in CRE fundamentals alongside higher interest rates has resulted in lower property prices. So with that in mind, do we think the CRE market represents a systemic risk to the economy via the banking sector?

>> Jay Bryson:

Yeah, that's a good question, Charlie. Particularly, you know, when you when you think about, you know, 15 years or so ago, you know, with the financial crisis, obviously we had a housing bubble starting 15 or 20 years ago. And then when all the property prices there went south and a lot of those mortgages went bad, banks had to write down trillions of dollars worth of loans. And that led to the financial crisis. And so, you know, the question is and you just mentioned with property prices moving lower, could we see a bunch of bankruptcies in the CRE market, which then has a knock on effect to the banking sector? And just to put things into perspective, so, you know, if you look at commercial mortgages on banks balance sheets, roughly today, it's about 13%. And to put that number in perspective, we've been up to 15% before without undue sort of problems in the banking sector. Back before the financial crisis, when you look at residential loans, mortgages on bank balance sheets, that was 20%. So again, we're at 13% today. So our view is this could cause challenges for, say, individual banks who may have, you know, maybe too much ‘exposure’ to CRE and maybe the wrong types of CRE. Could it have individual stories? And the answer is sure. Do we view this, though, as a systemic risk to the entire banking system, much like the residential real estate before the financial crisis? The answer to that is probably not. You know, again, it looks like when you look at total bank exposure to CRE, it seems to be in a manageable sort of territory. And the last thing that I would note here would be, if you look at the way the banking system is capitalized relative to where it was capitalized before the financial crisis and capitalization is the ability for banks to write down loans that withstand stress. The banking system today is much better capitalized than what it was 15, 20 years ago.  So, again, it could be an individual story, it could be idiosyncratic. But we don't view this as a as systemic. But this issue with CRE probably isn't going away anytime soon, at least not with rates where they are today, at least not with the structural changes we're seeing in the working place environment. So we'll continue to keep an eye on this. And again, thank you for these questions. This question was raised by one of the listeners, and so we decided to address it and we again would invite you to continue to submit questions that we can address in this, Ask Our Economists podcast series. Again, Charlie, thanks for joining us today to give us your expertise and thank you all for joining and listening.

>>Outro:

That’s all for this episode of the Ask Our Economists podcast and we thank you for joining us. If you enjoyed today’s episode, please share with colleagues, family, friends, and anyone who listens to podcasts. If you have any economic related questions or topics you would like to hear about in an upcoming episode, please email us at askoureconomists@wellsfargo.com. Ask Our Economists is produced by Wells Fargo.

>>Disclosures:

This podcast should not be copied, distributed, published, or reproduced, in whole or in part. 

The views expressed on this podcast represent the opinions of the authors on prospective trends in the domestic markets and the financial institutions industry and is intended for global financial institutions partners and customers, and other market participants who are customers of Wells Fargo. The views expressed within are not intended as a recommendation offer or solicitation with respect to the purchase or sale of any security or other financial product nor does it constitute professional advice. The views and opinions expressed are also not necessarily those of Wells Fargo and may differ from the views and opinions of other departments or divisions of Wells Fargo. Wells Fargo does not make any representation or warranty, express or implied, as to the accuracy or completeness of the statements or any information expressed within this podcast and any liability therefore (including in respect of direct, indirect, or consequential loss or damage) is expressly disclaimed.

We do not guarantee this information but have obtained it from sources we believe to be reliable. Opinions expressed are based on our experience and judgment as of this recording and are subject to change without notice. For the latest views of the Wells Fargo Economics team, please visit www.wellsfargo.com/cib/insights/economics.

This is not an offer to sell or to buy any security or foreign currency. Any past performance discussed during this podcast is no guarantee of future results. Any forward-looking statements or forecasts are based on assumptions and actual results may vary from any such statements or forecasts.

Any indices referenced  are for performance comparison are unmanaged and cannot be invested into directly. As always please remember investing involves risk and possible loss of principal capital; please seek advice from your licensed professionals.

All price references and market forecasts are as of the date of recording. 

Wells Fargo Corporate & Investment Banking (CIB) and Wells Fargo Securities (WFS) are the trade names used for the corporate banking, capital markets, and investment banking services of Wells Fargo & Company and its subsidiaries, including but not limited to Wells Fargo Securities, LLC, member of NYSE, FINRA, NFA, and SIPC, Wells Fargo Prime Services, LLC, member of FINRA, NFA and SIPC, and Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., member NFA and swap dealer registered with the CFTC and security-based swap dealer registered with the SEC, member FDIC.  Wells Fargo Securities, LLC and Wells Fargo Prime Services, LLC, are distinct entities from affiliated banks and thrifts.

>>  Intro:

Welcome to the Wells Fargo, Ask Our Economist podcast series, where we explore what's on our clients minds. Provide timely commentary on what's happening in the markets and discuss our outlook for the ever-changing investment landscape. Our economists provide their views on the latest domestic and global trends, insights on the demographics, social issues and challenges that impact our world, all which help you manage risk and capture opportunities. Join us as we take you down the road of navigating today's economic climate with confidence.

>> Jay Bryson:

Hello, I'm Jay Bryson, chief economist for the Corporate and Investment Bank at Wells Fargo. And you're listening to the Ask Our Economists Podcast series. So today we're going to talk about student debt, and there's two developments that households face this summer regarding student debt. The first is the Supreme Court is set to rule on the legality of the Biden administration's student loan forgiveness program. Now, I should note, as of this recording, the court has not yet made a ruling on that. And we'll come back. We'll talk about that in a few minutes. Regardless of what the court decides, though, there's a second development that is at the end of August, the moratorium on student debt payments is coming to an end. You may recall back during the pandemic, they put a moratorium on student debt payments during the pandemic. And that's been all that's been suspended now for about three years. And again, at the end of August, that moratorium ends and people start to need to start paying back their student loans. So today to talk about that, we have Tim Quinlan and Shannon Seery here with us. Tim and Shannon cover the household sector for us. And they're very, very well placed to talk about these developments. So, Shannon, let's start with you. Let's level set here. First of all. I mean, how many individuals are we talking about here? How many individuals have student loans? What's the gross amount of student loan debt outstanding today? And talk a little bit about it. You know how much that stuff has grown over the years.

>> Shannon Seery:

Sure, Jay. So there's about 43 million people who hold student loan debt, which is around 13% of the US population. So a decent share of Americans are affected by student loan debt. And collectively, these households hold about $1.6 trillion in student debt as of the first quarter of this year. Now that's up about 6.5% since the start of the pandemic, which is a relatively small increase compared to other loan categories, like mortgages, for example, in recent years. And that potentially could somewhat be related to what you just mentioned in terms of that moratorium that has been in place for the past three years or so. But student debt was growing disproportionately compared to other debt categories prior to the pandemic. So over the past cycle, from 2008 to 2019, for example, student loans rose 160%, which is nearly five times faster than the rise in total household debt over that period. So it's easy to see how this has become a growing burden for many US households over the past decade or so. And why the Biden administration has tried to tackle this issue.

>> Jay Bryson:

Okay, great. So let me ask you this. I mean, you hear all these horror stories in the media of, you know, an individual having you know, $200,000 worth of student loans or something. I mean, you know, how prevalent is that? I mean, can you talk a little bit about the distribution of that debt? You know, what's the average amount of debt out there? And again, you know, what does the distribution look like?

>> Shannon Seery:

Yeah, well, the truth is it's not very common that households have these extremely large debt burdens. And I think that's somewhat of a misconception about this topic. So only about 2% of borrowers or around a million people hold more than $200,000 in student debt. And to provide a bit more context on that, less than 1% of the total U.S. population holds $100,000 or more in student debt outstanding. So we don't mean to diminish that burden for these debt strapped households and dismiss the fact that they are dealing with a high debt burden. But it's a relatively small amount in the context of the entire country. And put this differently. Half of all borrowers have $20,000 or less in outstanding principal and interest, and the median amount owed by all borrowers is between 10,000 and $20,000. So I know we're throwing a lot of stats out there, but essentially most borrowers have a comparatively manageable amount of debt outstanding according to the data. Though, there is a small segment of the population that is overwhelmed by these debt burdens.

>> Jay Bryson:

Well, thanks for that data. I mean, it may be overwhelming, but, you know, again, it's good to have some real hard facts and figures here. And thanks for pointing some of those things out. So, Tim, let me let me turn to you two part question here. You know, in terms of these developments, let's start with the Supreme Court's decision. And again, as of this recording, the court has not yet ruled. But can you talk a little bit about what happens if the Supreme Court upholds the legality of the forgiveness program or if it doesn’t. What happens at that point?

>> Tim Quinlan:

So the way to think about this is if that overall pile of student loan debt that Shannon referenced earlier. You're talking about an estimated share and we say estimated because there's not a real clear hard accounting, because it's categorized of various households that are held Pell Grants as of a certain time. But the best estimates, even rounding to the absolute high end of the range would be round numbers about $600 billion or about a third of that total share. And they've they, like the rest of the holders, have not been making payments. And you kind of think about this in two ways. One is just sort of the flow of these numbers and the other is the total impact on aggregate net worth. When you with the stroke of a pen, eliminate this debt, it effectively lifts household net worth. So if the Supreme Court reverses the ruling, then it would technically bring down the amount of that net worth. And so if you take that $600 billion, it's a pretty big number. But if you factor that into the overall net worth, you're talking about something that is about a half a percentage point of total net worth. So really not terribly significant there.

>> Jay Bryson:

Let's move on now and talk about, you know, again, we don't know what the court is going to rule here, but we do know that the moratorium on debt payments is going to come to an end at the end of August. What does that mean now for, you know, consumer spending as we go forward?

>> Tim Quinlan:

Yeah, that's absolutely right. We know because of the discussions that helped bring the debt ceiling crisis to an end a few weeks ago involved an agreement that those student loan payments would resume at the end of August and beginning of September. And you're arriving at a precise dollar estimate is made a little bit difficult by a lack of a ready system of accounting. You've got to consider things like monthly payments varying by income, debt outstanding and the applicable rate. But we estimate that a typical student loan payment to be somewhere in the neighborhood of $200 to $300 a month, that in terms of income would be about 4 to 5% of annual median salary of around $70,000. And you might think, okay, well, if you multiply that by the round numbers, 40 million people that have student loans, it's still kind of a big number, right? I mean, these households haven't made a payment on these loans in three years. All of a sudden, they've got to go back to making them. Is that going to be disruptive? It absolutely will for those households. I think we can all attest to how inflation is carved up people's income and made it more difficult to spend. And all of a sudden having another bill to pay is not going to be easy. But when you add all those numbers up and roll it into broad categories of spending, the latest personal income and spending report puts the annualized rate of spending for the overall economy at between $18 trillion and $19 trillion. It's it's really not not even a rounding error in terms of the impact there. Now, the timing of this Jay happens to coincide with when we already expect consumers to be retrenching a little bit as the labor market begins to slow later this year. So it could be the straw that broke the camel's back. But, you know, on its own, we don't view this as something that would, you know, on its own stop the growth that we've had in consumer spending. All right.

>> Jay Bryson:

Well, that's that's very interesting. I like the way you said it, potentially the straw that breaks the camel's back, but not in and of itself. It doesn't sound like this by itself would necessarily cause a recession. You know, it's all the other factors. You know, we've talked about before, higher interest rates, real income, kind of stagnating, etc., etc..So this on top of it, perhaps, maybe this is that thing. So let me ask you this, Tim. So Shannon talked about this earlier. You know, at one time the student loan debt was growing very, very rapidly. Kind of reminds me of, say, subprime mortgages back before the financial crisis. And so, you know, seen in that context, is this a potential student loan debt? Is this a potential another mortgage crisis slash great financial crisis?

>> Tim Quinlan:

There I think I can give you a more unequivocal answer. The short answer is no, I don't. I don't think that it is. But let me put some numbers around it to give that some context. If we go back to 2008 and add up mortgage debt, that’s kind of fixed mortgage debt and prime equity lines, home equity lines of credit and things of that category, all of those mortgage debts added up to about $9 trillion. So that was, you know, 15 years ago when the economy was a lot smaller. So $9 trillion was, you know, a really significant sum of money and, yes, $1.7 trillion is a large amount today, but, you know, comparatively much, much smaller. And arguably the more impactful statement around this is that of the mortgage debt that was outstanding. It was owned by it was originated by all sorts of different banks, and some of it was held at those banks. Some of it was held in mortgage backed securities. It was kind of widely spread across the financial system. And and while there are some collateralized packages that hold student loans in them, a key difference today is that the originators of that debt is the federal government. The federal government owns more than 90% of all student loans outstanding today. And in that regard, I think that we can, you know, say that this is a more contained situation than the mortgage crisis was back in 2008.

>> Jay Bryson:

Well, excellent. Well, thank you both, Shannon and Tim for I think this has been a very enlightening conversation. And again, lots of statistics here, but it's it's really good with stories like this that kind of get magnified in the media to actually put some some real numbers behind them. And remember, these questions come from you folks who are listening to this. So we asked you to please keep sending us questions that you have. Would you like us to answer? So again, thank you for joining us today and we'll be out in future weeks with more podcasts. Thank you.

>>Outro:

That’s all for this episode of the Ask Our Economists podcast and we thank you for joining us. If you enjoyed today’s episode, please share with colleagues, family, friends, and anyone who listens to podcasts. If you have any economic related questions or topics you would like to hear about in an upcoming episode, please email us at askoureconomists@wellsfargo.com. Ask Our Economists is produced by Wells Fargo.

>>Disclosures:

This podcast should not be copied, distributed, published, or reproduced, in whole or in part. 

The views expressed on this podcast represent the opinions of the authors on prospective trends in the domestic markets and the financial institutions industry and is intended for global financial institutions partners and customers, and other market participants who are customers of Wells Fargo. The views expressed within are not intended as a recommendation offer or solicitation with respect to the purchase or sale of any security or other financial product nor does it constitute professional advice. The views and opinions expressed are also not necessarily those of Wells Fargo and may differ from the views and opinions of other departments or divisions of Wells Fargo. Wells Fargo does not make any representation or warranty, express or implied, as to the accuracy or completeness of the statements or any information expressed within this podcast and any liability therefore (including in respect of direct, indirect, or consequential loss or damage) is expressly disclaimed.

We do not guarantee this information but have obtained it from sources we believe to be reliable. Opinions expressed are based on our experience and judgment as of this recording and are subject to change without notice. For the latest views of the Wells Fargo Economics team, please visit www.wellsfargo.com/cib/insights/economics. 

This is not an offer to sell or to buy any security or foreign currency. Any past performance discussed during this podcast is no guarantee of future results. Any forward-looking statements or forecasts are based on assumptions and actual results may vary from any such statements or forecasts.

Any indices referenced  are for performance comparison are unmanaged and cannot be invested into directly. As always please remember investing involves risk and possible loss of principal capital; please seek advice from your licensed professionals.

All price references and market forecasts are as of the date of recording. 

Wells Fargo Corporate & Investment Banking (CIB) and Wells Fargo Securities (WFS) are the trade names used for the corporate banking, capital markets, and investment banking services of Wells Fargo & Company and its subsidiaries, including but not limited to Wells Fargo Securities, LLC, member of NYSE, FINRA, NFA, and SIPC, Wells Fargo Prime Services, LLC, member of FINRA, NFA and SIPC, and Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., member NFA and swap dealer registered with the CFTC and security-based swap dealer registered with the SEC, member FDIC.  Wells Fargo Securities, LLC and Wells Fargo Prime Services, LLC, are distinct entities from affiliated banks and thrifts.

>>  Intro: 

Welcome to the Wells Fargo, Ask Our Economist podcast series, where we explore what's on our clients minds. Provide timely commentary on what's happening in the markets and discuss our outlook for the ever-changing investment landscape. Our economists provide their views on the latest domestic and global trends, insights on the demographics, social issues and challenges that impact our world, all which help you manage risk and capture opportunities. Join us as we take you down the road of navigating today's economic climate with confidence. 

>> Jay Bryson: 

Hello, I'm Jay Bryson, chief economist for Wells Fargo's Corporate and Investment Bank. And you're listening to the Ask Our Economists podcast series. We've received some questions from you folks recently about mortgage rates and the housing market and all that. And so we thought it'd be a good time to loop in Charlie Dougherty who kind of heads up our analytical efforts in terms of housing to talk about some of these issues. So, Charlie, let’s start by just noting, you know, we've had a pretty significant rise in mortgage rates over the past year or two. The 30 year fixed rate mortgage, which is kind of the benchmark mortgage rate, just kind of closing in on 7% again. And so let’s review, how did we get here? You know, how much have rates risen and what's the catalyst behind all of this? 

>> Charlie Dougherty: 

So mortgage rates have come up quite a bit over the past few years. So let's go back in history a little bit. In 2021, the average mortgage rate was about 3%. Fast forward to October of 2022. The mortgage rate went up to almost 7%. So that is a 400 basis point increase, which we haven't seen since the early 1980s. So what's going on here? Well, we've had significantly tighter monetary policy in response to inflation. So the Fed has been hiking interest rates. The Fed doesn't control mortgage rates directly, but they do have a lot of influence over interest rates. And mortgage rates tend to follow the 10-year Treasury yield. And what we've seen is, as the Fed has raised interest rates, mortgage rates have gone up alongside it. So the thing to remember here is that inflation has been running really hot. The Fed has been tightening monetary policy and as a result, mortgage rates have gone up by quite a bit. Now, there is a technical thing happening here because mortgage rates are loosely benchmarked to the 10-year Treasury yield, there has been a widening of that spread. Now, that tends to happen during periods of economic uncertainty and over the history of that relationship, there's been about 170 basis point spread. That spread has increased to about 300 basis points recently. So there's been a number of things happening. But overall, mortgage rates remain significantly above the averages that we've seen over the past few years. 

>> Jay Bryson: 

Ok. Well, thanks for that review, Charlie. So what does that mean then, for you know, what's the effect on the housing market? What have we seen that's happened in terms of the housing market? And, you know, are there areas of the country that have felt it more than others? 

>> Charlie Dougherty: 

So higher interest rates, higher mortgage rates have worsened, affordability, and that has had a negative impact on really every facet of the housing market. So over the course of 2022, as mortgage rates went up, home sales went down, new residential construction went down, existing single family homes sales ended the year about 20% below where it was in 2021. So higher mortgage rates on top of higher home values. Right. So it's not just mortgage rates that went up. Before that, you know, you had home prices rising really sharply following the pandemic. Just to give you some numbers here, between January 2020 and May 2022, the existing single family median home price went up 40%. So that higher home prices and then now you have higher mortgage rates really pressured affordability for a whole lot of buyers. So, worse, affordability conditions really weighed down housing activity of all sorts. And now you're starting to see activity kind of perk up a little bit. Things are starting to improve a little bit, but overall housing activity is running well below the sort of robust levels that we saw in 2021 and in the early parts of 2022. Now, you asked which regions have been hit the hardest. And, you know, real estate is all local. And of course it varies from market to market and even from neighborhood to neighborhood. But generally speaking, the Western region has been hit disproportionately harder by the increase in mortgage rates and downshift in housing activity. So if you look at what's happening in some of the individual markets out there and what's been happening with home prices, if you look at San Francisco, Seattle, Phoenix, Las Vegas, these areas have seen a really sharp decline in home values, which really reflects a softening in buyer demand in those areas. So there's a few things happening. Western markets tend to be more influenced by the tech industry, and higher interest rates have created some turbulence in tech. So it makes sense that some of these housing markets have turned down a little bit. And the other thing is that home values went up a whole lot in these areas over the course of 2020 and 2021. So those home values were rising faster during that period and now they're coming down a little bit quicker as well. So, aside from the Western region, you know, other parts of the country are holding up a little bit better. So if you look at the northeast, there's really low supply of homes on the market in the northeast and that's helping conditions hold up a little bit better there. The southeast, there's a little bit more supply there. But, you know, the southeast is undergoing really strong population growth and that has helped supporting markets such as Miami and Atlanta and Charlotte, other southeastern markets where housing activity has been a little bit more resilient to the effects of higher rates. So there is a lot of regional variation, but overall activity is still running well below the levels that we saw, you know, in recent years. Okay. So, Charlie, you know, you just mentioned some interesting statistics and names there. You've talked about since the pandemic, house prices up 40% or so. I would note that relative to their high at the housing bubble back in 2006, relative to that, they're up 60%. You mentioned Phoenix and Las Vegas. I mean, I think of those places as kind of poster childs, if you will, for the last housing bust. 

>> Jay Bryson: 

So I think we'd be remiss if we didn't address the question of are we looking at another housing bubble this time? You know, and if the answer is no, then I got a follow up question. And if not, what's different this time? 

>> Charlie Dougherty: 

I do think it's a little bit different this time, and I think there's a few different things happening. One, after the housing bust, you know, lending has been a whole lot more conservative. For example, the share of originations to subprime lenders is much lower compared to the period right before the housing boom. Additionally, if you look at what's happening on the supply side, right, there's not been a whole lot of overbuilding this time around. So, for example, there is about 1.7 million single family units under construction in 2005. You know, we've never gotten back to those levels. So supply is lower. Demand, I would say, is a little bit stronger this time around. Remember, you have a whole lot of younger millennials who are entering the market. And if you actually look at the number of 25 to 35-year-olds right now, they are exceeding the baby boom in terms of this current generation. So you have a really strong underlying demand component. Add in the effects of remote work where people just need a little bit more space. In terms of housing. You have less of a supply and demand imbalance compared to what we saw, you know, in the housing boom and subsequent bust. Another thing is that home values have gone up by a whole lot. Right. We mentioned that home values at one point were up 40%. So that's a whole lot of equity as well for those that own their homes. So that could prevent any of the negative impacts that we saw back then during the housing bust as well. So, Jay, that leads me to this next question. You know, if the run up in mortgage rates was caused by the Fed tightening monetary policy in response to inflation, what are our expectations for monetary policy and interest rates going forward? 

>> Jay Bryson: 

So first of all, let’s just set the field here. So just keep in mind that since March of 2022, the Fed has raised rates by 500 basis points. That's the fastest pace of tightening that we've seen since the early 1980s. You know, our sense is the Fed is not done quite yet. There's another meeting in June and there's one in July. I think it's likely that they will raise by another 25 basis points at either of those meetings. At this point, we think they'll probably on hold in June, lean towards another rate hike in July because the economy is showing some resilience. But we also think that things are starting to slow down in terms of the economy. Inflation has come down somewhat, still has got a ways to go, but we think it will be coming down further. And so we think the Fed is close to being done at this point. But that said, I wouldn't expect rates to come down significantly any time soon. As a matter of fact, we don't expect them to start cutting rates until next year. Now, you mentioned Charlie, the yield on the 10-year Treasury security. That's kind of what the, you know, benchmark mortgage rates are set off of. So that's currently right now around, you know, 3.5 % or so. We think it'll probably hang out these sorts of levels for a while. And as we get in the second half of the year, as expectations of Fed easing start to build, you'll start to see a rally and that you'll start to see long term interest rates come down. But, you know, we're thinking it's going to go back down to roughly 3% or so. We'd be very, very surprised if rates, the 10-year Treasury rate goes back to 1% where it was, you know, two years ago. So, you know, back to you now, Charlie, given that, what does that mean for our outlook for the for the housing market in the next year or two. 

>> Charlie Dougherty: 

Alongside, you know, slightly lower interest rates, you know, mortgage rates are likely to come down a little bit, but we're probably not going back to those 3% rates that we saw a few years ago. So considering that mortgage rates are likely to remain elevated, that's going to pressure affordability and that's going to keep housing activity in general a little bit below where we were in previous years. That said, you know, you have easing inflation, you have sturdy income growth, right? The labor market remains pretty strong right now. So even if mortgage rates do remain elevated, that should help housing activity in general improve a little bit. So, you know, in terms of housing construction, what we're looking for is a modest improvement off of recent activity levels. So we're looking for single family housing construction to increase a little bit this year. We're not looking for a full fledged rebound, however. Right. So new single family construction is probably likely to edge higher, but we're probably not going to go back to the levels that we saw in 2021. In terms of home pricings, the big thing in the single family market right now is there's just such little supply. Right. So right now there's about 900,000 single family units available for sale. That's lower than even the 1.7 million that were available right in June of 2019. So there's really relatively little homes for sale, and that's going to help support prices. Right. So demand is at least looks like it's coming back as affordability conditions improve slightly. So home prices aren't likely to fall. And if you actually look at the month to month changes in home prices so far this year, they've been positive. So bearing all that in mind, we're expecting home prices, you know, not to take off like they did after the pandemic, but to kind of get back to a normal pace of appreciation. So we're looking for, you know, slow home price increases this year and next. So overall, you know, housing activity looks like it's improving slightly. We're still running at a level that's well below where we were in 2021. But things are starting to perk up a little bit. 

>> Jay Bryson: 

Well, thanks, Charlie. Thanks for your insights here today. And we hope you all find these podcasts to be insightful. And again, these are based on questions that you are submitting. So please keep the questions coming. But in the meantime, again, thank you for listening today and we wish you all well until our next podcast. Thank you. 

>>Outro: 

That’s all for this episode of the Ask Our Economists podcast and we thank you for joining us. If you enjoyed today’s episode, please share with colleagues, family, friends, and anyone who listens to podcasts. If you have any economic related questions or topics you would like to hear about in an upcoming episode, please email us at askoureconomists@wellsfargo.com. Ask Our Economists is produced by Wells Fargo. 

>>Disclosures: 

This podcast should not be copied, distributed, published, or reproduced, in whole or in part.

The views expressed on this podcast represent the opinions of the authors on prospective trends in the domestic markets and the financial institutions industry and is intended for global financial institutions partners and customers, and other market participants who are customers of Wells Fargo. The views expressed within are not intended as a recommendation offer or solicitation with respect to the purchase or sale of any security or other financial product nor does it constitute professional advice. The views and opinions expressed are also not necessarily those of Wells Fargo and may differ from the views and opinions of other departments or divisions of Wells Fargo. Wells Fargo does not make any representation or warranty, express or implied, as to the accuracy or completeness of the statements or any information expressed within this podcast and any liability therefore (including in respect of direct, indirect, or consequential loss or damage) is expressly disclaimed. 

We do not guarantee this information but have obtained it from sources we believe to be reliable. Opinions expressed are based on our experience and judgment as of this recording and are subject to change without notice. For the latest views of the Wells Fargo Economics team, please visit www.wellsfargo.com/cib/insights/economics. 

This is not an offer to sell or to buy any security or foreign currency. Any past performance discussed during this podcast is no guarantee of future results. Any forward-looking statements or forecasts are based on assumptions and actual results may vary from any such statements or forecasts. 

Any indices referenced  are for performance comparison are unmanaged and cannot be invested into directly. As always please remember investing involves risk and possible loss of principal capital; please seek advice from your licensed professionals. 

All price references and market forecasts are as of the date of recording. 

Wells Fargo Corporate & Investment Banking (CIB) and Wells Fargo Securities (WFS) are the trade names used for the corporate banking, capital markets, and investment banking services of Wells Fargo & Company and its subsidiaries, including but not limited to Wells Fargo Securities, LLC, member of NYSE, FINRA, NFA, and SIPC, Wells Fargo Prime Services, LLC, member of FINRA, NFA and SIPC, and Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., member NFA and swap dealer registered with the CFTC and security-based swap dealer registered with the SEC, member FDIC.  Wells Fargo Securities, LLC and Wells Fargo Prime Services, LLC, are distinct entities from affiliated banks and thrifts.

>>  Intro:
Welcome to the Wells Fargo, Ask Our Economist podcast series, where we explore what's on our clients minds. Provide timely commentary on what's happening in the markets and discuss our outlook for the ever-changing investment landscape. Our economists provide their views on the latest domestic and global trends, insights on the demographics, social issues and challenges that impact our world, all which help you manage risk and capture opportunities. Join us as we take you down the road of navigating today's economic climate with confidence.

>> Jay Bryson:
Hello, I'm Jay Bryson, chief economist for Wells Fargo's Corporate and Investment Bank. And you're listening to the Ask Our Economists Podcast series. So recently we've gotten a number of questions about the Chinese economy. And so we thought we'd loop in international economist Brendan McKenna to talk us through some of these. So, Brendan, before we talk about the outlook for the Chinese economy, let’s kind of talk about where we are now and where we've been more recently, how has the Chinese economy performed let’s say over the last few years or so?

>> Brendan Mckenna:
Yeah, that's a great question, Jay. And I would say the Chinese economy has been very volatile over the last few years, and I'd say the Chinese economy has kind of flipped from being an outperformer maybe early in the pandemic in 2020-2021, and then flipped to being a relative underperformer maybe last year and now over the course of the first couple of months of 2023.
So just to put some numbers to that, in 2020, China was one of the very few economies that actually recorded positive growth during the peak era of the pandemic. And then 2021, we saw a pretty robust rebound by some of the restrictions came off and we saw the Chinese economy grow 8.5%, which was also considered a relative outperformance relative to some of the major emerging market economies and then also relative to the G10 economies. But then last year, as kind of COVID mutated, some new variants came out and Chinese authorities remained committed to the zero COVID policies, we really saw those types of policies have a dampening effect on economic activity across China, and we saw the economy grow only 3%, which was a significant underperformance relative to how we were initially forecasting China's economy to perform. So Jay in summary, I would say the economy has been very volatile. And again, flipping from outperformer earlier in the pandemic and then later in the pandemic to a relative underperformer.

>> Jay Bryson:
Okay, great. Let's talk then about the near-term, just looking forward for the next few years, where do you see the Chinese economy going over the course of 2023 here and into 2024?

>> Brendan Mckenna:
Yeah, I think the prospects have certainly improved, and I'd say the prospects have improved really because some of the zero COVID policies have been lifted and a lot of the pandemic type of restrictions that have come to define China's economy over the last 12 to 24 months or so have gone away. So in that sense, we're looking for China's economy to grow 6% this year, which is a figure China's economy has not been able to grow at that kind of rate for the last couple of years. And I would also say that that growth number has been revised since the start of the year. So it's been a relatively optimistic start to China's economy for this year. However, I would say we're starting to see some of the economic momentum soften a little bit earlier than maybe we would have initially expected. So some of the indicators that are really leading for China's economy, like retail sales, industrial production, the manufacturing and services PMIs, those have all started to soften over the course of the last month or two. And then maybe some of the higher frequency alternative data like subway usage and mobility, those are all starting to trend lower as well. So I would say the risks around our 6% forecast are tilted to the downside for this year. And I think it's more likely that we see a downward revision than an upward revision to our 2023 growth forecast. And then for next year, we're looking for growth to slow below 5%, which again, if you're considering how China's economy has grown historically, that's a relatively slow growth rate. So I would say mixed prospects for this year and then maybe next year, not as robust as we would have liked to expect out of China's economy. So, Jay, I want to flip it over to you. And the Chinese economy has clearly benefited from this theme of globalization. And earlier this year, you wrote a series of reports on the outlook for globalization and how globalization may evolve. How do you expect globalization to affect the Chinese economy in the years to come?

>> Jay Bryson:
Yes, it's a good question, Brendan. And we did write a series of reports a few months ago. And just, you know, for people who want to reference it, it's on our website wellsfargo.com/economics. Now this series reports was largely focused on the U.S. economy. But in general, you know, globalization clearly helped the Chinese economy. It became a member of the World Trade Organization starting in 2001. And, you know, if you look at what happened to foreign direct investment into China, it just poured into the country. At the turn of the century, foreign direct investment in China was running about $40 billion a year. A decade later, that was approaching $300 billion. And so you have all that money pouring into China on top of China's high savings rates to begin with. And that just creates a scenario of just very, very rapid capital investment, which drives GDP growth. And so what we saw was, you know, the Chinese economy in the first decade of the century and throughout much of the second decade, actually grew 10% or more. And Brendan, as you just pointed out, you know, China has slowed down tremendously over the last number of years, no longer growing anywhere close to 10%. Part of it's just law of large numbers just can't grow 10% forever. You go to infinity and that's just not going to happen. But the second thing is some retrenchment at best, a stalling of globalization and probably some retrenchment in globalization that's going on. That's caused by a number of things, really. I mean, one that springs to mind would be COVID experience, you know, with supply chains. Lots of businesses, not only United States, Western Europe, decided they wanted to have supply chains closer to home than in China. And of course, then there's the whole geopolitical angle as well. Do you want to be investing as much into China now that China and at least the United States are, you know, kind of strategic competitor to us at this point?
And so what we've seen is foreign direct investment in China has slowed. Last year, it was only $180 billion versus almost twice that ten years before that. And again, you know, the Chinese economy has continued to slow down. So a reversal of globalization, if that continues, would certainly be a headwind on Chinese GDP growth and it would be certainly one factor that would limit GDP growth kind of as we go forward. But Brendan, that's not the only headwind that China faces. It also has some demographic sort of issues and it has worrying levels of debt, at least in its business sector. So how do you see those things playing out and how does that affect the Chinese economy in years to come?

>> Brendan Mckenna:
Yeah, absolutely, Jay. The Chinese economy certainly has some more structural types of headwinds that can certainly weigh on the economy over the very long term. So to your point about the population decline, we actually saw the Chinese population decline by about 850,000 people last year. That's a relatively significant structural issue within China's economy. And I would say the working age population has probably already peaked in China, and that's also earlier than the United Nations is actually forecast about ten years earlier. So this was an issue that was already on people's radar, but now it's coming a little bit more to the forefront as it's actually materializing earlier than I think we would have initially expected. But as the population shrinks, there are some dynamics that can occur as a result of that. You'll probably see labor costs in China start to rise over time, which can act as a drag on exports. And your point earlier about supply chains potentially moving out of China, higher labor costs could really exacerbate the downtrend in China's export sector. So there's a bit of a compounding effect on a shrinking population. I think there's also a scenario where if the population is shrinking, demand for housing and other types of residential real estate could start to decline. And we know that residential real estate contributes pretty significantly to China's economic growth. So fewer couples starting families could eventually be a rather significant drag on residential real estate purchases. And again, have compounding effects for potential growth rates in China. And then finally, I guess I would say the smaller population could eventually just lead to less tax revenue, and that's less resources that China's government can potentially deploy towards future investment to enhance the potential of China's economy. So the shrinking population is definitely a major structural headwind that China's economy has to compete with over the decades to come. And then to your point, Jay, on the business sector debt especially within the non-financial corporate sector, there's certainly a lot of leverage overhanging the Chinese economy. Well, to put some numbers to it, the non-financial corporate debt is worth about 160% of China's economy. And if you were just to compare that to the United States, the U.S. non-financial corporate sector has debt worth about 55% to 60% of GDP. So you can kind of see on a relative basis that China's economy just has a ton of leverage. But we're starting to see the effects of that. We're starting to see again, to your point earlier, Jay, about FDI into China is slowing. That's something that's really a product of this kind of leveraging, over leverage and debt situation. We're also seeing portfolio flows into the non-financial corporate sector of China also starting to slow as well. So there's also this situation where there's potential government bailouts, which can again divert potential investment funds that China can use to enhance future potential GDP growth. So it's this combination of a population decline and then also business sector debt worries that can really limit the future potential growth rates in China over the very longer term.

>> Jay Bryson:
Well thanks, Brendan. Thanks for coming on today for this Ask Our Economists podcast series and thank you all for the questions that you are submitting. You know, again, these are questions that are coming from you. We're trying to answer as many as we can, so please keep them coming our way. And until next time, we wish you all a good day. Thank you.

>>Outro:
That’s all for this episode of the Ask Our Economists podcast and we thank you for joining us. If you enjoyed today’s episode, please share with colleagues, family, friends, and anyone who listens to podcasts. If you have any economic related questions or topics you would like to hear about in an upcoming episode, please email us at askoureconomists@wellsfargo.com. Ask Our Economists is produced by Wells Fargo.

>>Disclosures:
This podcast should not be copied, distributed, published, or reproduced, in whole or in part.
The views expressed on this podcast represent the opinions of the authors on prospective trends in the domestic markets and the financial institutions industry and is intended for global financial institutions partners and customers, and other market participants who are customers of Wells Fargo. The views expressed within are not intended as a recommendation offer or solicitation with respect to the purchase or sale of any security or other financial product nor does it constitute professional advice. The views and opinions expressed are also not necessarily those of Wells Fargo and may differ from the views and opinions of other departments or divisions of Wells Fargo. Wells Fargo does not make any representation or warranty, express or implied, as to the accuracy or completeness of the statements or any information expressed within this podcast and any liability therefore (including in respect of direct, indirect, or consequential loss or damage) is expressly disclaimed.

We do not guarantee this information but have obtained it from sources we believe to be reliable. Opinions expressed are based on our experience and judgment as of this recording and are subject to change without notice. For the latest views of the Wells Fargo Economics team, please visit www.wellsfargo.com/cib/insights/economics.

This is not an offer to sell or to buy any security or foreign currency. Any past performance discussed during this podcast is no guarantee of future results. Any forward-looking statements or forecasts are based on assumptions and actual results may vary from any such statements or forecasts.

Any indices referenced  are for performance comparison are unmanaged and cannot be invested into directly. As always please remember investing involves risk and possible loss of principal capital; please seek advice from your licensed professionals.

All price references and market forecasts are as of the date of recording.

Wells Fargo Corporate & Investment Banking (CIB) and Wells Fargo Securities (WFS) are the trade names used for the corporate banking, capital markets, and investment banking services of Wells Fargo & Company and its subsidiaries, including but not limited to Wells Fargo Securities, LLC, member of NYSE, FINRA, NFA, and SIPC, Wells Fargo Prime Services, LLC, member of FINRA, NFA and SIPC, and Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., member NFA and swap dealer registered with the CFTC and security-based swap dealer registered with the SEC, member FDIC.  Wells Fargo Securities, LLC and Wells Fargo Prime Services, LLC, are distinct entities from affiliated banks and thrifts.

>>  Intro:
Welcome to the Wells Fargo, Ask Our Economist podcast series, where we explore what's on our clients minds. Provide timely commentary on what's happening in the markets and discuss our outlook for the ever-changing investment landscape. Our economists provide their views on the latest domestic and global trends, insights on the demographics, social issues and challenges that impact our world, all which help you manage risk and capture opportunities. Join us as we take you down the road of navigating today's economic climate with confidence. 

>> Jay Bryson:
Hello, I'm Jay Bryson, chief economist for Wells Fargo's Corporate and Investment bank. And you're listening to the Ask Our Economists Podcast series. We've gotten a lot of questions lately about the crisis in the regional banking system in the United States. So I'm joined here today by senior economist Sarah House to talk about some of the implications of that. So, Sarah, let’s just level set here, First Citizens Bank bought Silicon Valley Bank back in mid-March. Flagstar Bank acquired Signature Bank and JPMorgan Chase took over First Republic Bank. So depositors in these failed banks didn't lose any money. So, you know, should we really care? 

>> Sarah House:
So we absolutely should care. So over the past couple of months, we've seen the three out of four biggest bank failures in the nation's history. And any time you see events like these, it can greatly affect the flow of credit through the economy and send jitters through market. So while depositors didn't lose any money, we did see equity holders lose money, which can make it more difficult or expensive for other strained banks to raise capital later on should they need it. And really, this comes down to a lot of concerns over spillovers and uncertainty about whether the situation would worsen in those early days of March and whether it still may worsen yet. And so we've seen tighter financial conditions. If you look at the Bloomberg Financial Conditions Index, for example, which looks at what's happening in bond equity and money markets. So that tightened in as much as it did in the first really couple of months of the Fed's tightening cycle when the Fed was looking like it was increasingly going to raise rates at a rapid pace over just a single week in March. So we certainly saw tighter financial conditions in the market. We also saw credit markets really come to a standstill. So in the week following the failures of SVB and Signature Bank, you had no investment grade bond issuance. You saw spreads widen in those first few weeks of March. You also saw no high yield issuance for about two weeks. And while we've seen financial conditions ease since those first couple of weeks of March, both in terms of what you're looking at, credit spreads or just broader financial conditions, they're still tighter than what we saw in late February that first few days of March before we saw these events. 

>> Jay Bryson:
Ok great. Well, thanks, Sarah. And, you know, you talked a lot about credit markets there and obviously the corporate bond market plays a very important role in the overall financing of the US economy. And, you know, we can get real time data on credit spreads and on issuance and, you know, etc., etc.. But obviously, let’s don't forget about banks here. Banks also play a very critical role in the financing of the US economy. So do we have any evidence to suggest that banks have become more cautious since some of these regional bank failures? 

>> Sarah House:
We do. Which really isn't surprising, considering banks themselves have been at the heart of these financial strains that we've seen since early March. So if you look at the senior loan officer opinion survey, so we did get that for the first quarter recently. And what we've seen there is credit standards have tightened dramatically across the board. So we've seen tighter standards for businesses, consumer loans, that includes your credit cards and auto loans, as well as real estate loans so tighter standards for both commercial real estate as well as residential real estate. Now, I think it's important to note that this tightening started really in earnest even before the events of March. So in Q4, we saw credit standards tighten really to an extent that we typically haven't seen outside of recessions. So for example, in the first quarter here, you had a net 47% of banks report tighter standards on commercial industrial loans to small businesses. And so that's the most you've ever seen besides 1990, 2001, 2008 and 2009 and 2020. So certainly not exactly a great harbinger of credit growth to come. And similarly, you saw a market tightening in commercial real estate loans. So on that you have 65% or more banks saying that they've tightened standards on multi-family, nonresidential or land development. Now, the reasons for this are multifold. So if you look at the senior loan officer survey, they did a special question on why banks are tightening standards and the most frequent reasons were there is a lot more economic uncertainty in this environment. So both in terms of just what the Fed's been doing as well as just the recent turmoil in the banking sector, but there's also a reduced tolerance for risk. Banks are concerned about deteriorating collateral values of their customers, and there's also concerns about funding costs and liquidity, and notably those concerns about liquidity, as well as deposit outflows and funding costs were higher among your mid-size and smaller banks in this report. So it does seem like those banks are having perhaps still a little bit more more trouble or a little bit more cautious than what we're seeing in the large bank sector. 

>> Jay Bryson:
Okay. So evidence of tighter credit. Is that translating, though, into actual declines in bank lending or slower growth in bank lending? 

>> Sarah House:
We're not seeing actual declines in bank lending, at least on trend, but we have seen bank credit slow. So it's important to note that I think some of the slowdown isn't all just purely from banks tightening standards. Demand has worsened, too. So especially for commercial and industrial loans as well as CRE loans. But when we step back and we look at the actual loan volumes sitting on commercial banks. So those are still up about nine and a half percent over the past year. But that's a bit of a slowdown from roughly the 12% year over year rate we saw at the end of 2022. Now, we've seen a slowdown in consumer loans. We've seen it in commercial real estate loans and to a lesser extent, mortgage loans. But really, the slowdown has been most pronounced in commercial and industrial loans. So those are up just 8% year over year versus closer to about 13% at the start of the year. Now, they've rebounded a little bit here over the past month as we've seen conditions calmed down a little bit. But the pace of the past month, they're growing just about four and a half percent annualized. So still a pretty notable slowdown from the run rate that we're seeing late last year and even through the first few months of this year. Now, Jay, maybe you can take a few minutes and talk to us about what are the macro economic implications of this impact to the bank and what does it potentially mean for the Fed? 

>> Jay Bryson:
Let's start with the macro implications. First, Sarah, I was kind of struck as you were answering those questions, how many times you used the word tight, tighter conditions, and then that translates into slower bank lending and credit issuance in general. And it's just another headwind, you know, on on the economy, right? We have the Fed who's raised rates by 500 basis points so far. So interest rates now are higher and so businesses have to pay more for credit. And then if you layer on top of that, decreased willingness to make loans or stricter standards by which businesses can qualify for loans. That's all just another headwind on the economy. And so it's another reason why we continue to expect the U.S. economy to slip into a modest recession later this year. So what are the implications for the Fed if we do slip into a recession? You would expect that the Fed would be cutting rates. Our sense is they really want to see inflation come down before that happens. And if you do go into recession, that will put some downward pressure on inflation. And so our guess is that the Fed remains on hold through most of the year, that you will have a little recession at the end of this year and put some downward pressure on inflation. And then that allows the Fed to cut early next year. But I guess what I would also say is if for some reason this regional banking issue becomes more out of hand, if it starts to morph more into a 2008 financial crisis sort of thing, then you're looking at a much deeper downturn potentially than what we are anticipating here. And that could actually lead the Fed at some point then to to cut rates. But we are reasonably confident that the Fed and other authorities have the tools available to make sure that this crisis remains relatively contained. So obviously, it's a you know, it's a very fluid sort of situation. And as our thoughts continue to evolve, we'll keep you all up to date with that. So thank you all very much for joining our Ask our Economists podcast series. And we will be keeping you posted with further updates. Thanks for joining us. 

>>Outro:
That’s all for this episode of the Ask Our Economists podcast and we thank you for joining us. If you enjoyed today’s episode, please share with colleagues, family, friends, and anyone who listens to podcasts. If you have any economic related questions or topics you would like to hear about in an upcoming episode, please email us at askoureconomists@wellsfargo.com. Ask our Economists is produced by Wells Fargo.

>>Disclosures: 

This podcast should not be copied, distributed, published, or reproduced, in whole or in part. 

The views expressed on this podcast represent the opinions of the authors on prospective trends in the domestic markets and the financial institutions industry and is intended for global financial institutions partners and customers, and other market participants who are customers of Wells Fargo. The views expressed within are not intended as a recommendation offer or solicitation with respect to the purchase or sale of any security or other financial product nor does it constitute professional advice. The views and opinions expressed are also not necessarily those of Wells Fargo and may differ from the views and opinions of other departments or divisions of Wells Fargo. Wells Fargo does not make any representation or warranty, express or implied, as to the accuracy or completeness of the statements or any information expressed within this podcast and any liability therefore (including in respect of direct, indirect, or consequential loss or damage) is expressly disclaimed. 

We do not guarantee this information but have obtained it from sources we believe to be reliable. Opinions expressed are based on our experience and judgment as of this recording and are subject to change without notice. For the latest views of the Wells Fargo Economics team, please visit www.wellsfargo.com/cib/insights/economics. 

This is not an offer to sell or to buy any security or foreign currency. Any past performance discussed during this podcast is no guarantee of future results. Any forward-looking statements or forecasts are based on assumptions and actual results may vary from any such statements or forecasts. 

Any indices referenced  are for performance comparison are unmanaged and cannot be invested into directly. As always please remember investing involves risk and possible loss of principal capital; please seek advice from your licensed professionals. 

All price references and market forecasts are as of the date of recording. 

Wells Fargo Corporate & Investment Banking (CIB) and Wells Fargo Securities (WFS) are the trade names used for the corporate banking, capital markets, and investment banking services of Wells Fargo & Company and its subsidiaries, including but not limited to Wells Fargo Securities, LLC, member of NYSE, FINRA, NFA, and SIPC, Wells Fargo Prime Services, LLC, member of FINRA, NFA and SIPC, and Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., member NFA and swap dealer registered with the CFTC and security-based swap dealer registered with the SEC, member FDIC.  Wells Fargo Securities, LLC and Wells Fargo Prime Services, LLC, are distinct entities from affiliated banks and thrifts.

>>  Intro:
Welcome to the Wells Fargo, Ask Our Economist podcast series, where we explore what's on our clients minds. Provide timely commentary on what's happening in the markets and discuss our outlook for the ever-changing investment landscape. Our economists provide their views on the latest domestic and global trends, insights on the demographics, social issues and challenges that impact our world, all which help you manage risk and capture opportunities. Join us as we take you down the road of navigating today's economic climate with confidence. 

>> Jay Bryson:
Hello, I'm Jay Bryson, chief economist for Wells Fargo's Corporate and Investment bank. And you're listening to the Ask Our Economists podcast series. Joining me today is senior economist Michael Pugliese, and we'll be talking about the debt ceiling. So, Mike, let's start at ground zero here. What exactly is the debt ceiling? 

>> Michael Pugliese:
Yeah, so the debt ceiling or the debt limit, you'll also hear it be called sometimes it's a legal limit on how much the federal government can borrow. So right now, the debt ceiling or the debt limit is about $31.4 trillion. So government can borrow up to that amount, but it can't borrow any more than that. And when the federal government is running a budget deficit on an annual basis like it is right now, I mean, sooner or later that debt ceiling is going to need to be increased in order to permit the borrowing that needs to be done to finance that difference between revenues and outlays. 

>> Jay Bryson:
Okay. So what happens when the Department of the Treasury hits the debt ceiling? 

>> Michael Pugliese:
Yeah. So when they hit the debt ceiling, I just like to think about this very simply as they're no longer able to borrow to finance government operations. So you have to rely on three things. One is just don't forget, tax revenue continues to come in the door from individuals, from companies, businesses. And so that tax revenue, one, that cash inflow keeps you going. A second thing is cash on hand. So the Treasury keeps an account at the Federal Reserve that operates kind of like a checking account does to a household. It's called the Treasury General account. And that account has some money in it. And then it allows the Treasury to take deposits and have withdraws and just continue sort of the fiscal agent responsibility of running the federal government. So there's some money there that they can tap. And then finally, you have these extraordinary measures, which are a variety of accounting maneuvers that the U.S. Treasury can pull in order to free up a little more headroom. They're not limitless. They are a finite resource and they're are different sizes depending on what time of year. But, you know, those extraordinary measures can buy additional time above and beyond just the tax revenue and the cash on hand that the Treasury has to pay its bills. 

>> Jay Bryson:
Okay. So let's let's talk a little bit about those extraordinary measures. Now, you just mentioned that they're not infinite, you know, they can only last a little bit of time, it can buy them some headroom, etc., etc.. So what happens if they're all exhausted and the debt ceiling still hasn't been increased? You know, is there a so-called we'll call it break the glass option for policymakers? 

>> Michael Pugliese:
And this is what financial markets and analysts and economists spend so much time thinking about. They say, okay, well, once the tax revenues have run dry, once the Treasury's general account is at zero, once there are no more extraordinary measures, what happens then and this is where you start to enter defaults scenario discussions. If you've ever heard the term the X-date, that's what this is talking about, this idea that there's some date in the future after which Treasury would no longer be able to meet its obligations in full on time because the revenues coming in wouldn't be enough to make the outlay payments in full and these extraordinary measures would be exhausted. And there's been a slew of discussion about policy alternatives in the wake of crossing the X-state. But the problem is all of them are untested. In many cases, they come with their own sets of cons, and no one really knows how financial markets or the economy would react to such a situation. So let me give a few examples of that. You know, one question that comes up is could Treasury prioritize payments on the national debt, with the idea being that they would make payments on the principal and interest on the debt in order to avoid a technical default? Now, this is interesting. It’s certainly something that's been talked a lot about. Treasury's official position is that this is not an option. But regardless of where you land on this, I think it's just important to keep in mind that sure, maybe in that scenario a technical default is avoided, but someone somewhere would still be getting shortchanged because by definition there's not enough money to meet everyone who's owed it by the federal government. And whether that's members of the military or civil service employees or the court system or Social Security beneficiaries, the list goes on. Someone somewhere would still be shortchanged, and that would have economic implications and financial market implications I think that we would talk about in a little bit. Another question is, what about the Fed? Right. Where do they come in in this scenario? But the challenge here for the Fed is a lot of the tools that they might normally lean on in a financial crisis like, say, COVID in 2020 or in 2008. They work at a cross purpose of the inflation fight that the Fed has going on right now. So cutting rates aggressively or going out and doing QE, that creates challenges given where we are in the economic cycle right now. And furthermore, I think the Federal Reserve would have some hesitations about getting involved in what is a very politically charged and fiscally motivated fight. When we look back at the transcripts from the 2011 debt ceiling fight, which we have now that it's been so long since those Fed meetings occurred, you can see policymakers at the central bank really struggled with this topic and they discussed things as simple as just going in to repo markets to try to make sure they operated more smoothly. To much more aggressive operations such as doing QE on defaulted securities. The idea being you would take those defaulted Treasury securities out of the market. But even there, Chair Bernanke at the time said the bar was very, very high to those sorts of activities. And they came back with their own cons and then finally even discussions about could the president act unilaterally on the debt ceiling? You know, we're not legal scholars here. We'll leave it to those folks to analyze what the legal situation is on that front. But again, I just think it's important to think about how precarious the financial and economic outlook could be in a situation where whether or not the debt ceiling has been breached is being decided before the Supreme Court. So there are a lot of different things out there that have been discussed among all the different players at the Fed, at the Treasury and the executive branch. But I think all of them come with a lot of different drawbacks and cons and uncertainty when it comes to the implications for the economy. 

>> Jay Bryson:
Okay. Well, thanks for that, Mike. So here we set in early to mid-May. Many folks will be listening to this in, you know, in mid-May. Do you have an expectation of so when the Treasury hits the so-called X-date, and just to refresh everyone's memory, that's the date in which they no longer have enough cash to pay all their obligations. So what about that, Mike? What's your best guess on when this date, the so-called X-date is? 

>> Michael Pugliese:
Yeah. So right now, I think the two most likely periods to contain the X-date are the first few days of August and the first week or two of June. And you might be saying to yourself, well, how does that make any sense? How could the two dates be so far apart? The U.S. government's cash flows are very lumpy. The cash coming in and the cash going out is not evenly distributed over the course of a month or a week or even within weeks. And so, you know, when you look at the X-date right now in early June, it's clear Treasury is going to hit a very low point on its cash balance and extraordinary measures. And if they can get to June 15, that's a corporate quarterly tax payment deadline. So that'll be another infusion of revenue there. And then on June 30th, one more extraordinary measure gets unlocked. That should buy Treasury at least a few more weeks. So you kind of put that together and you can see how the math becomes. If Treasury can get to June 15th, they can probably get towards the end of July or the beginning of August. So this creates a real challenge for Treasury. And I think we saw this in Treasury Secretary Yellen's communications to Congress recently, where she sent a letter to leaders in Congress saying that you know Treasury may not be able to get through that first half of June period and could run into the X-date. So I think early June is a period that needs to be treated very seriously, although there's still a chance they might be able to get to June 15th and then by extension get towards the end of July. So regardless of if it's in early to mid-June or early August, the X-date’s clearly coming up on us very soon, over the next few months. 

>> Jay Bryson:
Okay. So, you know, at the end of the day, this is kind of a political decision, right? The two main actors here would be President Biden and Speaker McCarthy. And so it's going to be a political decision whether they negotiate here or, you know, pass a debt ceiling increase, whatever. Mike, look into your crystal ball, what's the prospects of the increase in the debt ceiling or, you know, a suspension or those sorts of things? 

>> Michael Pugliese:
The way I look at it right now, over the course of the next month or so, I can envision three possibilities. And there's a lot of uncertainty here, but I'll do my best to unpack it. The first possibility is there's a big sweeping agreement between the two parties, specifically between the President and the speaker of the House, like you just referenced, Jay. And they come to an agreement to increase or suspend the debt ceiling for a meaningful amount of time, you know, 1 to 2 years, maybe even past the 2024 election. I'm a little skeptical that'll happen in the near term, you know, I think that's ultimately what it's going to take eventually. But like we just talked about, there's not that much time, as we record this here in early May, you know, we're talking one month away from a potential June X-date deadline and there are a lot of issues to be hammered out between the two parties that remain very far away from each other on this negotiation. I think a more likely outcome is potentially a punt, a debt ceiling increase or suspension, but rather than one or two years, it's for one or two months. And there are some benefits to that. One, it buys more time for the two parties to get on the same page on this topic. And two, there's another separate fiscal fight still lingering here. So the end of fiscal year 2023 occurs on September 30th, and Congress has still not passed the annual appropriation bills that set annual spending levels and appropriations for the military and other forms of non-defense discretionary spending. And so those decisions have to be made at some point between now and the fall regardless. And so I wouldn't be surprised if there was a short term debt ceiling increase to try to align those two deadlines for later this year and give the two parties and leaderships in both parties time to negotiate it. And then the last possibility, potentially, you know, the most frightening one is we test that early June period and the debt ceiling is not increased or suspended. And Treasury's cash balances dip very low in the first half of June, potentially even breach that X-date deadline. And again, I don't think that's the most likely outcome, but it's it's clearly a possibility out there that that could happen. And so let me ask you the hard question then, Jay, what happens? What are the economic implications if we do indeed default on the debt? And again, just to reiterate, that's not our base case expectation. That's not in our baseline economic forecast. But given that it's at least a tail risk scenario, it's certainly something worth thinking about. Can you walk us through what the economic implications might be of actually crossing the X-date and having a default on the U.S. national debt? 

>> Jay Bryson:
Well, Mike, you know, the honest answer is nobody knows, right? We've never done this before. If you go back and you look at history, so if you go back to August 2011, that's the closest we've come. That thing went kind of right up to the wire. And just if you look at the financial market implications, again, we went right up to the wire there. S&P downgraded US government debt at that point. And then there was a big reaction in financial markets. The S&P 500 went down over the next few weeks, went down by about 15% or so, almost a bear market. Lots of volatility in financial markets if you look at the real effects. In August, consumer confidence nosedived and actually real GDP in the third quarter of 2011 actually contracted modestly during that period of time, and that's without a default. Now, if you have an actual default, again, nobody really knows. But what we do know is the market for U.S. Treasury securities is the deepest, most liquid, most transparent financial market in the world. Treasury securities act as collateral for trillions and trillions and trillions of dollars of other financial instruments. And if you bring the value of that collateral into question, it's going to have a lot of really negative implications in the financial markets. You know, is this a kick off of a great Depression or, you know, a major recession or something like that? Again, nobody really knows here. But, you know, it is something that is obviously very, very serious. And in the past, two parties have come together to raise the debt ceiling. And Michael as you said before, that is, you know, kind of our base case. How exactly we get there, we don't know. But, you know, there is a tail risk of something very, very serious happening economically if we were to actually default on our debt. Obviously, this is something that we're keeping a very, very close eye on. And as our thoughts continue to evolve, we'll continue to keep you all apprised. So thank you for listening to our Ask Our Economists podcast series. Again, we will be coming back with more as the situation evolves. Thank you very much. 

>>Outro:
That’s all for this episode of the Ask Our Economists podcast and we thank you for joining us. If you enjoyed today’s episode, please share with colleagues, family, friends, and anyone who listens to podcasts. If you have any economic related questions or topics you would like to hear about in an upcoming episode, please email us at askoureconomists@wellsfargo.com. Ask our Economists is produced by Wells Fargo.

>>Disclosures:
This podcast should not be copied, distributed, published, or reproduced, in whole or in part.

The views expressed on this podcast represent the opinions of the authors on prospective trends in the domestic markets and the financial institutions industry and is intended for global financial institutions partners and customers, and other market participants who are customers of Wells Fargo. The views expressed within are not intended as a recommendation offer or solicitation with respect to the purchase or sale of any security or other financial product nor does it constitute professional advice. The views and opinions expressed are also not necessarily those of Wells Fargo and may differ from the views and opinions of other departments or divisions of Wells Fargo. Wells Fargo does not make any representation or warranty, express or implied, as to the accuracy or completeness of the statements or any information expressed within this podcast and any liability therefore (including in respect of direct, indirect, or consequential loss or damage) is expressly disclaimed. 

We do not guarantee this information but have obtained it from sources we believe to be reliable. Opinions expressed are based on our experience and judgment as of this recording and are subject to change without notice. For the latest views of the Wells Fargo Economics team, please visit www.wellsfargo.com/cib/insights/economics. 

This is not an offer to sell or to buy any security or foreign currency. Any past performance discussed during this podcast is no guarantee of future results. Any forward-looking statements or forecasts are based on assumptions and actual results may vary from any such statements or forecasts. 

Any indices referenced  are for performance comparison are unmanaged and cannot be invested into directly. As always please remember investing involves risk and possible loss of principal capital; please seek advice from your licensed professionals. 

All price references and market forecasts are as of the date of recording. 

Wells Fargo Corporate & Investment Banking (CIB) and Wells Fargo Securities (WFS) are the trade names used for the corporate banking, capital markets, and investment banking services of Wells Fargo & Company and its subsidiaries, including but not limited to Wells Fargo Securities, LLC, member of NYSE, FINRA, NFA, and SIPC, Wells Fargo Prime Services, LLC, member of FINRA, NFA and SIPC, and Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., member NFA and swap dealer registered with the CFTC and security-based swap dealer registered with the SEC, member FDIC.  Wells Fargo Securities, LLC and Wells Fargo Prime Services, LLC, are distinct entities from affiliated banks and thrifts.

>>  Intro:
Welcome to the Wells Fargo, Ask Our Economist podcast series, where we explore what's on our clients minds. Provide timely commentary on what's happening in the markets and discuss our outlook for the ever-changing investment landscape. Our economists provide their views on the latest domestic and global trends, insights on the demographics, social issues and challenges that impact our world, all which help you manage risk and capture opportunities. Join us as we take you down the road of navigating today's economic climate with confidence.

>> Jay Bryson:
Hello, I'm Jay Bryson, chief economist for Wells Fargo's Corporate and Investment bank. And you're listening to the Ask Our Economists podcast series. Joining me today is senior economist Sarah House, and we're going to be talking about some issues with the labor market. Let me just start off and kind of level set here. And if you go back to the last expansion, which essentially that went between 2010 and right before the pandemic in early 2020, US economy added an aggregate of 22 million jobs during that period of time. The unemployment rate, which was at 10% in early 2010, fell to 3.5% right before the pandemic. That was essentially a 50 year low. And then the pandemic hit and all that progress essentially got wiped out in two months. We lost 22 million jobs between March and April of 2020, and the unemployment rate spiked to almost 15% in April of 2020. But over the last few years, we've kind of recouped all of that. As a matter of fact, since the low point. We've added a total of 25 million jobs. Now, if we would have kept growing at our pre-pandemic pace of about 190,000, we'd still be about 4 million short. But, you know, nonetheless, we've made some pretty good progress there. And the unemployment rate is back to its all time low. Essentially, it's at a 50 year low of roughly 3.5%. So, Sarah, let's start there. Tell us about where some of those jobs have been added over the last few years, you know, in terms of industry concentration.

>> Sarah House:
Yes. I think early on in the recovery where we saw the job growth being driven, it was really goods related industries. That was areas like transportation and manufacturing. Construction came back pretty quickly as they found ways to work through some of the COVID restrictions. And then it was also, I’d say, services industries that were work from home friendly. So things like information finance, so jobs that you could do from behind a computer in your home.
Now, more recently where we've seen the job growth being driven, it's come from industries that I think lag the overall initial recovery. So that suggests that there's still some catch up going on buoying the overall pace of wage growth. So, for example, we've seen leisure and hospitality jobs. So they've accounted for almost 25% of the 4 million jobs that we've added over the past year, even though they're still down about 2% from their pre-COVID peaks. We've seen similarly strong job gains in terms of percentage terms over the past year in smaller industries like mining and other services. So those are also industries that have yet to recoup all the jobs lost in the COVID recession. And then we're also seeing some catch up, I think, going on in government as well. So we're really seeing that rotation towards more in-person services or just industries that have generally been laggards over the past three years.


>> Jay Bryson:
Okay, great. So we're talking about industries, but let's talk about people here, particularly the labor force participation rate. And just to define that term, that's the percentage of people who are 16 years or older who are actively participating in the labor market. So that means they either have a job or they are actively looking for one. And so if you look right before the pandemic, that was around 63.3%. That nosedived to about 60% in April of 2020. And it slowly has made its way back. But we're back to 62.6% right now. We haven't recouped that pre-pandemic level just yet. So Sarah, who's coming back into the labor force and who's not?

>> Sarah House:
So we have seen the overall recovery in labor force participation lag the cycle that's pretty typical. And I think what we've seen in this cycle has been the fact that it's been less about the availability of jobs, which I think was the big hurdle to getting participation back in the last expansion. So following the 2008-2009 downturn. But it's really been more about, I think, constraints on workers as well as to some extent less financial needs. So things, you know, think health considerations, childcare issues, but also just the fact that consumer finances came out of the COVID recession stronger than they went in. If you think about balance sheet savings, etc.. Now, as you mentioned, Jay, we have seen some progress here over the course of this cycle. And in fact, we've actually seen participation rise for four consecutive months to a fresh cycle high still below 2020, but not terribly far off from its demographic adjusted trend. But it's been very uneven across different demographic groups. So if you look at what we consider prime age workers, so 25 to 54, likely done with their education, but probably too early to retire, even if they've done very well for themselves. Participation among that group is all the way back to where it was before COVID. In fact, if you look at the total share of that group actually working. So factoring in how low unemployment is, it's actually higher than at any point since the spring of 2001. So for that group, we think there's probably some limited scope for further gains, maybe some further gains in areas like prime men's participation, which hasn't recovered. It's been disproportionately driven by prime age women. If you look at younger end of the spectrum so teenagers, participation there is all the way back. But the biggest deficit we've seen is among older workers. So we saw participation there really plummet early on like other groups, but it's been a much more muted recovery. And in fact, still, if you look at 65 and older participation, there is down almost two percentage points. And that reflects, I think in part some of the improved financial conditions among households, but also the fact that these workers were more susceptible to, I think some of the health issues that were were a hallmark of this downturn. But overall, that composition really matters when your older workers have been the fastest growing portion of the population. And this has really been a big difference between what we saw in the pre-COVID participation rate trends where older workers had some of the firmest participation rates that we saw in the past cycle. So by our estimates, if you look at just some of the pre-COVID participation rate trends and factor in just the demographic changes in the US population, so we're probably missing about 2.5 million workers in the workforce. But a little over half of those are workers over 55. So still disproportionately older workers we find are the workers who just haven't come back to the extent that we would have expected or have been laggards in general.

>> Jay Bryson:
Well thanks, Sarah, so what are some of the implications of that slow return of the labor force participation rate? Particularly, what does it mean for, you know, say, wage inflation in the economy?

>> Sarah House:
Well, overall, employers are still struggling to hire and the labor market remains very tight. So we can see that with the unemployment rate at three and a half percent. So just a tick above its 53 year low. At the same time, you have 43% of small businesses saying that they have at least one job hard to fill. So that's come down since where we were earlier this cycle, but it's still above any previous peak in other economic cycles. So still very tight jobs market and overall that suggests that wage pressure is likely to remain elevated. Now, we have seen some slowing in job growth over the past few months. I think that reflects some of the jobs switching frenzy coming out of COVID, beginning to die down and retention and restaffing being less of an issue among businesses. But we're still seeing overall employment costs still well above what it was last cycle. So, for example, the employment cost index in the fourth quarter, the most recent period we have, we're still running about 4% annualized versus a peak year over year rate of just under 3% the last cycle. So with the jobs market, I think still tight overall, we don't expect to see wage growth really mitigate much until we see a lot more slack in the jobs market. And so I think overall, you're still looking at a labor market that's contributing to above target inflation. So, Jay, with inflation still being such an issue and in part being driven from the tight state of labor market, what are the implications of that for monetary policy?

>> Jay Bryson:
Yeah. So Sarah you mentioned if you look at the employment cost index in the fourth quarter, running around 4% at an annualized rate. That's just not consistent with a 2% inflation target. If it continues to run at 4%, you're probably looking at inflation that’s probably closer to three. And that's kind of above where the Fed would like it to be. And so what the Fed would like here is to bring the supply of labor, labor force participation, if you will, back in line with the demand for labor. Unfortunately, the Fed's tools really can't affect that supply side very much. What they can work on is the demand side. So how do you slow down the demand for labor? It's pretty simple. You slow the economy down and that's through higher interest rates. And that's what the Fed has been trying to do here. Now, they're not purposely trying to put the economy into recession or anything, but what they're trying to do is slow the economy enough so that the demand for labor slows, so that wage growth slows to bring down inflation down to 2%. And, you know, we think that the Fed has done a lot of tightening so far, 475 basis points in the course of a year. We think they've got maybe one more rate hike to go and then they'll probably going to leave it where interest rates where they are just to make sure that the economy slows enough again to bring inflation back down to the 2% target where they would like it to be.
But Sarah that's some near-term sort of implications here for the labor market. Let's talk about longer term implications, particularly slow growth in the labor force. If we have the slow growth continue in the labor force, what does that mean for the U.S. economy in coming years?


>> Sarah House:
Right. So I think the supply challenges we’ve seen in the cycle, they have been tied to some pretty unique factors like the health issues and just the sheer policy support we saw. But I think we have to remember that this comes against a backdrop of structurally weaker supply growth. So we see that in terms of the US population trends. So before COVID, the US population was rising about half a percent. So that compares to closer to 1% in the first decade of the 2000’s. And that downshift reflects both lower fertility as well as weaker immigration. So in other words, you have to get higher labor force participation if just the pool of potential labor isn't growing as fast. Now, when we factor in just some of those immigration trends, as well as just the sheer population aging here in the US, the BLS, the Bureau of Labor Statistics, who puts together a lot of these labor market indicators. So they predict that the population aged 16 and over so that total working age population grows about 8/10 of a percent over the rest of the decade. But the what I would consider more of the true working age population. So you're 16 to 64, that's only estimated to grow point 2%. So really just a fraction of the overall growth in your population at age 16 plus is coming from workers who I think are more realistically likely to engage in the labor market and tend to have that higher population growth. So I think we're going to be stuck in this period where there's more upward pressure on labor costs, holding other things like productivity growth equal beyond just this current cycle. And when we think about just overall growth for the economy, we have to remember that labor is an input into production. So yes, you can have capital. Hopefully you're getting more technology that's boosting productivity, but you still need workers to run some of those machines, fix some of those machines, create that that innovation which drives productivity growth. And I think at the end of the day, slower labor force growth, it does act as a brake on total growth. So you still need people to run these businesses. And so I think it's just these slower trends in labor supply growth is something we need to be thinking about just beyond this most recent cycle.

>> Jay Bryson:
Well, thanks, Sarah. And one thing I want to touch on there is you did mention something about productivity growth. There is a potential thing out there that could change productivity growth pretty significantly in coming years, and that's artificial intelligence. That's, in our view, is a productivity game changer that also has profound social and political implications as well. And those implications really are beyond the scope of this podcast here. But potentially it could be a topic for a future podcast. But thank you all for listening. You've been listening to our Ask Our Economists podcast series and we'll be back with more podcast in the coming weeks and months. Thank you very much.

>>Outro:
That’s all for this episode of the Ask Our Economists podcast and we thank you for joining us. If you enjoyed today’s episode, please share with colleagues, family, friends, and anyone who listens to podcasts. If you have any economic related questions or topics you would like to hear about in an upcoming episode, please email us at askoureconomists@wellsfargo.com. Ask our Economists is produced by Wells Fargo.

>>Disclosures:
This podcast should not be copied, distributed, published, or reproduced, in whole or in part.
The views expressed on this podcast represent the opinions of the authors on prospective trends in the domestic markets and the financial institutions industry and is intended for global financial institutions partners and customers, and other market participants who are customers of Wells Fargo. The views expressed within are not intended as a recommendation offer or solicitation with respect to the purchase or sale of any security or other financial product nor does it constitute professional advice. The views and opinions expressed are also not necessarily those of Wells Fargo and may differ from the views and opinions of other departments or divisions of Wells Fargo. Wells Fargo does not make any representation or warranty, express or implied, as to the accuracy or completeness of the statements or any information expressed within this podcast and any liability therefore (including in respect of direct, indirect, or consequential loss or damage) is expressly disclaimed.

We do not guarantee this information but have obtained it from sources we believe to be reliable. Opinions expressed are based on our experience and judgment as of this recording and are subject to change without notice. For the latest views of the Wells Fargo Economics team, please visit www.wellsfargo.com/cib/insights/economics.

This is not an offer to sell or to buy any security or foreign currency. Any past performance discussed during this podcast is no guarantee of future results. Any forward-looking statements or forecasts are based on assumptions and actual results may vary from any such statements or forecasts.

Any indices referenced  are for performance comparison are unmanaged and cannot be invested into directly. As always please remember investing involves risk and possible loss of principal capital; please seek advice from your licensed professionals.

All price references and market forecasts are as of the date of recording.

Wells Fargo Corporate & Investment Banking (CIB) and Wells Fargo Securities (WFS) are the trade names used for the corporate banking, capital markets, and investment banking services of Wells Fargo & Company and its subsidiaries, including but not limited to Wells Fargo Securities, LLC, member of NYSE, FINRA, NFA, and SIPC, Wells Fargo Prime Services, LLC, member of FINRA, NFA and SIPC, and Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., member NFA and swap dealer registered with the CFTC and security-based swap dealer registered with the SEC, member FDIC.  Wells Fargo Securities, LLC and Wells Fargo Prime Services, LLC, are distinct entities from affiliated banks and thrifts.

>>  Intro: 

Welcome to the Wells Fargo, Ask Our Economist podcast series, where we explore what's on our clients minds. Provide timely commentary on what's happening in the markets and discuss our outlook for the ever-changing investment landscape. Our economists provide their views on the latest domestic and global trends, insights on the demographics, social issues and challenges that impact our world, all which help you manage risk and capture opportunities. Join us as we take you down the road of navigating today's economic climate with confidence. 

>> Jay Bryson: 

Hi, I'm Jay Bryson, chief economist for Wells Fargo's Corporate and Investment Bank. And you're listening to the Ask Our Economists Podcast series. Today, I'm joined by senior economist Tim Quinlan and senior economist Michael Pugliese. And we're going to talk about the implications for the recent troubles in the regional banking system here in the United States, and specifically what it means for our economic forecast. Now, we should start out just by saying that any economic forecast is based on a number of underlying assumptions and typically, in call them, quote, ‘normal times,’ we don't bore you with many of these assumptions. Like, for instance, we assume that there won't be a nuclear exchange between the United States and North Korea. Right. I mean, we all know that that potentially could happen. But part of our economic forecast is we assume it won't happen. If it does you change your forecast? That's typically how those things work. But when things become really uncertain, I think it's imperative among us to make some of our forecast explicit. So what we're doing here in our forecast is we are explicitly assuming that authorities will take whatever steps are necessary in coming days, weeks and perhaps months to make sure that what we're seeing in financial markets right now is not another repeat of 2007, 2008, and I think that's a relatively valid sort of assumption. If you go back to 2007, 2008, you know, the authorities, particularly the Federal Reserve, took a lot of steps at that time to make that financial crisis less bad than otherwise would be. And they did the same thing back in 2020. So I don't know exactly what steps will be needed. But, you know, the Fed and other authorities have shown themselves to be very adept to come up with programs to stabilize the financial system and then to try to minimize the impact on the overall economy. But even if they end up doing that, we still think there's going to be some economic ramifications, particularly when you look at credit, you look at what's happening in credit markets right now. Credit spreads have widened. We think they will probably remain wide for coming weeks and months, and that will be a headwind on issuance in the corporate bond market. 

>> Jay Bryson: 

We wouldn't be surprised to see lending standards at banks also tightened going forward, and that will also be a headwind on the macro economy. So, Tim, let me turn to you and ask you, you know, given that, what's the implications here for the U.S. macroeconomy and forecast? 

>> Tim Quinlan: 

Yeah, Jay, the funny thing is the strength of hiring and consumer spending so far in 2023 have been more robust than we or really anyone else expected. We've had this recession call in place for a while and fundamentals were strong enough at the start of this year that that recession call was almost in jeopardy at times with this path toward soft landing becoming a little bit easier to find, even as it kind of makes the Fed's job a little bit harder because they'll have to raise rates even more to get inflation under wraps. So how does the banking crisis over the past couple of weeks change things? Well, as you sort of described in the wake of a banking crisis, it stands to reason that access to credit will be diminished. And our sense is that a tightening in borrowing conditions will have a more material impact on businesses, but it will have some impact on the consumer and household sector as well. You know, the staying power of personal spending has already been kind of propped up for the last year or so by a three legged stool. Those three legs are a drawdown in excess savings, credit card borrowing and real income growth. And two out of the three of those haven't really been impacted by this banking crisis, or at least not yet. You know, savings is still there and the job market so far is okay. It’s the credit piece that we do start to worry about. But later this year, as excess savings dry up and as the labor market begins to soften, we suspect that the lack of credit will really start to become a lot more evident in spending, particularly as those other legs of the stool kind of get kicked out. We've got real spending slowing in the second quarter of the year before it starts to post actual outright declines in the second half of the year. And those declines are now larger than what we had previously. And while consumers may carry some of their momentum into the second quarter, there's less momentum in key categories of business spending. In fact, equipment spending kind of a key barometer of CapEx already declined in two out of the past three quarters. And we now have equipment spending declining pretty much every quarter all the way out until the middle part of next year. Now, intellectual property spending will see some carryover in the first part of the year. It’s been pretty strong so far. But even that could succumb to tightening as the credit backdrop deteriorates a little bit later on this year. You know, industrial production has been flat or down slightly in eight of the last 11 months. You kind of point to this idea that manufacturing to some extent is already in recession. Bottom line, we estimate real GDP will contract 1.2% on a peak to trough basis, and the unemployment rate will rise to a peak of just over 5% in the first quarter of next year. So, you know, as downturns go, Jay, that makes this kind of a fairly mild one. The financial crisis, for example, saw peak to trough decline of closer to 4%. This is obviously kind of a far cry from that. You know, this crisis that we find ourselves in stems from rising rates. That itself was sort of a response to high inflation. So Mike, I'll turn it to you now and maybe you could give us some indication on what the outlook for inflation is in the context of all this. 

>> Michael Pugliese: 

Yeah, well, when I think about the inflation side of things, it's also moved quite a bit relative to where the Federal Reserve was just a month and a half ago when they last met. So, at their previous meeting in February, I think about the situation on inflation for the Fed is improving, you know, still a ways to go, but moving in the right direction. You had seen progress on falling headline inflation largely due to much lower energy prices of oil and natural gas and some other categories like that had eased relative to their peaks in 2022. And we'd also seen much slower goods inflation, particularly as some of the hardest hit supply chain challenge sectors had seen price growth slowed quite a bit or even enter deflationary territory, whether it was used cars or appliances, furniture, many physical items like that. And when you looked at the second half of 2022 inflation data, it marked a clear deceleration, again, not all the way back to 2%, but moving in the right direction. And a couple of things have happened since then. So, the first was a lot of that Q4 and second half of last year's inflation data got revised up where just, you know, as an example, core CPI inflation, which previously we thought was running at about a 3% three month annualized rate to finish last year, got revised up into the mid four. So, a pretty substantial revision. And then on top of that, we've gotten two more CPI readings since the Fed's last meeting and both of those have been pretty strong. They're not as high as they were last year, but more of a plateauing around core inflation in that 4.5%, 5% range. In terms of the underlying run rate. And so in the background of this pretty strong economic data on the real side of the economy that Tim just laid out and through a lot of the very uncertain and volatile developments of the past couple of weeks, you've continued to see inflation data remain quite hot. Whether it's where we finished last year in terms of just a momentum into 2023, and also the first few reports that we've gotten this year and I think in the near term that's probably set to continue for many of the exact reasons that Tim just laid out. There continues to be pretty positive forward momentum in the real economy. And I think that's very much true on the inflation side as well. But as we get later into this year and you start to see some of the cracks emerge, whether it's from tighter financial conditions as a result of the financial system, stress as we've seen in the past couple of weeks, or even just the lagged impact from tighter monetary policy, it's easy to forget that, you know, the Federal Reserve just began tightening policy a year ago when they did their first 25 basis point rate hike off the zero lower bound in March 2022. So as those cumulative effects build, as you start to see the pass through to real spending, real investment, to hiring, to all those factors, I do think you'll see inflation moving down further over the remainder of this year, probably not all the way back to 2%. So just to put some numbers around it, we've got core PCE inflation, which is kind of the Fed's preferred measure of inflation still at 3.4% on a year over year basis in the final quarter of this year. And if you look at it on a length quarter basis, it's close to 3%. So not all the way back to the Fed's target, but continuing to move a lot closer to what the Federal Reserve, I think, would tolerate and potentially might let them ease policy as we get into next year. And it's a similar side on the labor market. I know you touched on this a little bit already, Tim, but when you think about where the labor market is right now, still quite strong, finished the fourth quarter last year averaging almost 300,000 jobs per month, averaging 400,000 jobs per month through the first two months of this year. I think you can continue to see some more near-term strength over the March, April, May, very near-term employment reports. But those too, I think, will roll over as we get later in the year. And there are already signs of this despite the strong headline labor market data. If you look at the breadth of hiring, it's not nearly as strong as it was a couple of quarters ago. Wage growth has started to soften When you look at three and six month trends, quit rates are falling, job openings rolling over. So, you pull all those factors together. And I do think there are some signs that despite the near-term strength, if we forward project this nine, 12, 15 months, we're going to be looking at a very different labor market picture. And as you've already outlined, Tim, a peak unemployment rate of five and a quarter or something in that ballpark. So pulling that together, Jay, maybe a still pretty strong near term inflation outlook, strong labor market outlook, potentially weakening quite a bit as we get to later this year. Where does that leave the Fed both in terms of near-term monetary policy and also looking a bit further down the forecast horizon into next year? 

>>Jay Bryson: 

You know, near-term Mike, what I would say is we think that the Fed at their FOMC meeting on March 22, we think that they will pause just to see what's going on in, you know, in financial markets at that point. Now, many of you who are going to listen to this podcast are probably going to listen to this after March 22. And what I would say is if they do raise rates on March 22, by say 25 basis points, we wouldn't be completely surprised about that. But whether or not they pause here on March 22 or not, we think by May, if our underlying assumption about, you know, they've done enough to stabilize the financial system is correct, they get back to watching the data. You know, the economy is not completely falling apart at that point. We think they would probably go ahead and raise rates again. We think the peak Fed funds rate, which is right now at 475 as I speak, we think that will probably peak out around 525. So, let's call it another 50 basis points of tightening. And then over the summer, we think that they pause kind of for good at that point because by that point we think they'll start to be seeing signs of more slowing in the economy. And I think that, you know, at that point, pausing is the best course of action. We think they'll remain on hold through most of this year. And then towards the end of the year, maybe at the December FOMC meeting, maybe they start cutting at that point. But in general, as we look into 2024, if our forecast, you know, as Tim was talking about a mild recession, mild to modest sort of recession comes to pass, we would think you're looking at a significant amount of easing next year, let's call it 275 basis points or so of easing. We don't think they're going back to 0% like they were back between 2010 and 2016  or so. And then again right after the pandemic. But, you know, if we do have a recession, we think that we'll see some significant easing next year. But again, that's for next year. In sum, I would wrap up by saying, we thought coming into these problems that there was going to be a modest recession in the United States. Remain of that view. We think it'll be a little bit deeper than what we were thinking before these problems started to arise. We think the probability of recession is probably higher than what it was two or three weeks ago. But again, we think it's relatively more modest, but obviously it's a very, very fluid situation right now. We are keeping a very close eye on it, monitoring it.  And as changes are needed to our forecast, we will definitely keep you all apprised of that. So again, thank you all for joining us today for our Ask Our Economist podcast series. This is Jay Bryson, the chief economist for Wells Fargo. Again, thanking you very much. 

>>Outro: 

That’s all for this episode of the Ask Our Economists podcast and we thank you for joining us. If you enjoyed today’s episode, please share with colleagues, family, friends, and anyone who listens to podcasts. If you have any economic related questions or topics you would like to hear about in an upcoming episode, please email us at askoureconomists@wellsfargo.com. Ask our Economists is produced by Wells Fargo. 

>>Disclosures: 

This podcast should not be copied, distributed, published, or reproduced, in whole or in part. 

The views expressed on this podcast represent the opinions of the authors on prospective trends in the domestic markets and the financial institutions industry and is intended for global financial institutions partners and customers, and other market participants who are customers of Wells Fargo. The views expressed within are not intended as a recommendation offer or solicitation with respect to the purchase or sale of any security or other financial product nor does it constitute professional advice. The views and opinions expressed are also not necessarily those of Wells Fargo and may differ from the views and opinions of other departments or divisions of Wells Fargo. Wells Fargo does not make any representation or warranty, express or implied, as to the accuracy or completeness of the statements or any information expressed within this podcast and any liability therefore (including in respect of direct, indirect, or consequential loss or damage) is expressly disclaimed. 

We do not guarantee this information but have obtained it from sources we believe to be reliable. Opinions expressed are based on our experience and judgment as of this recording and are subject to change without notice. For the latest views of the Wells Fargo Economics team, please visit www.wellsfargo.com/cib/insights/economics. 

This is not an offer to sell or to buy any security or foreign currency. Any past performance discussed during this podcast is no guarantee of future results. Any forward-looking statements or forecasts are based on assumptions and actual results may vary from any such statements or forecasts. 

Any indices referenced  are for performance comparison are unmanaged and cannot be invested into directly. As always please remember investing involves risk and possible loss of principal capital; please seek advice from your licensed professionals. 

All price references and market forecasts are as of the date of recording.

Wells Fargo Corporate & Investment Banking (CIB) and Wells Fargo Securities (WFS) are the trade names used for the corporate banking, capital markets, and investment banking services of Wells Fargo & Company and its subsidiaries, including but not limited to Wells Fargo Securities, LLC, member of NYSE, FINRA, NFA, and SIPC, Wells Fargo Prime Services, LLC, member of FINRA, NFA and SIPC, and Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., member NFA and swap dealer registered with the CFTC and security-based swap dealer registered with the SEC, member FDIC.  Wells Fargo Securities, LLC and Wells Fargo Prime Services, LLC, are distinct entities from affiliated banks and thrifts.

>>  Intro:

Welcome to the Wells Fargo, Ask Our Economist podcast series, where we explore what's on our clients minds. Provide timely commentary on what's happening in the markets and discuss our outlook for the ever-changing investment landscape. Our economists provide their views on the latest domestic and global trends, insights on the demographics, social issues and challenges that impact our world, all which help you manage risk and capture opportunities. Join us as we take you down the road of navigating today's economic climate with confidence.

>> Jay Bryson:

Hi, I'm Jay Bryson, chief economist for Wells Fargo Corporate and Investment Bank. And you're listening to the Ask Our Economists podcast series. Joining us today is senior economist Sarah House and Shannon Seery, also an economist with our group. And we're going to be talking about a report they just published entitled Party of One: How Single Women Stack Up in the US Economy.

>> Jay Bryson:

So, Sarah, let me ask you first, what motivated you to focus here on single women?

>> Sarah House:

Well, it was really two-fold. So first, we like to take Women's History Month to take a moment to kind of maybe step back from sort of the shorter-term cyclical fluctuations in the economy we're looking at. And just a little bit deeper dive on certain segments of the population. And last year, we focused on the childcare industry. So why it was struggling so much to bring back workers and how the lack of childcare workers was amplifying the labor shortage, particularly for women and just why the industry challenges were a persistent headwind to women's labor supply. But childcare is disproportionately, although not entirely, a married women's issue. So this year we thought it would be nice to take a deeper look at some of the economic trends amongst single women. So, it's a rapidly growing group and we wanted to better understand how single women are interacting with the labor market and what that means for their financial well-being and their economic prowess ahead.

>> Jay Bryson:

Okay, great. So, Shannon, Sarah just mentioned it's a rapidly growing group. So can you tell us about kind of the growth rate of single women and what's really driving it as it divorces are going up or married men are dying earlier or what's going on here?

>> Shannon Seery:

Sure. So we've seen the share of single women really only grow. Over half of women in the US are now single, which is equivalent to just over a quarter of the total US population. So, it’s a decent chunk of the country. Now we're thinking about single women. You have those who are previously married and are now separated, divorced or widowed, and those who have simply never married. And it's this never married segment that has accounted for all of the growth in single women over the past decade. So, this population has grown about 20%, which outpaces the increase in never married men and is about two times faster than total population growth in the United States. So, the reason we're seeing this group rise so quickly, is because women are marrying later, but also more women are simply not marrying at all. So, there is a larger portion of older women today that have never married compared to historically. And we haven't seen much growth in the previously married single segment. But as you can imagine, the largest share of older single women are still those who are widowed.

>> Jay Bryson:

Thanks Shannon. So, Sarah, let's talk a little bit about labor force participation. So historically, men have had a higher labor force participation rate than women. And right now, the rate among men is about 68%. It's roughly 11 percentage points higher than the comparable rate for women. And historically, the lower rate for women reflected the fact that many married women they took on unpaid work at home and didn't go into a, you know, a full time job. So, does this increase in single women, does it have implications for the overall labor force participation rate?

>> Sarah House:

Yes. So, and I think that's one of the most exciting implications of the report, is that the rise in single women is helping the economy grow faster by boosting the overall labor supply. So, except for widows, the vast majority of which are beyond their working years, never married, women, divorced, separated. They have higher participation rates than married women. Now, participation among previously married women has declined over the past decade. But a lot of that has to do with just this group getting older and moving to years that are more likely to be retired. But if you look at the total contribution of single women to the labor force over the past decade, they've added about a percentage point to women's total participation rate. So, in contrast, single men have actually detracted from the male participation rate, and that increase can be entirely traced to never married women. So, it's not just that this group is growing faster, but they also have the highest participation rate out of any marital group of women. And in addition, just getting bigger in size, they've actually seen the biggest increase in their participation rates over the past decade. And a lot of this can be tied to just the behavioral changes of this group growing labor force attachment even more than what we've seen between never married men. So overall, this group is contributing to growing labor supply.

>> Jay Bryson:

Okay. Well, thank you, Sarah. So, Shannon, let's turn to you and talk about the so-called quote, ‘mommy penalty.’ And what that refers to is women generally get paid less than many men, even for the same jobs. A number of reasons behind that. But one of the reasons may be because women with children may not be able to gain as much job experience as men, because, let's face it, women are still the primary caregivers in our society. And many women may decide to stay home to raise their children and can't get that job experience. But, you know, this increase in single women, many who are probably childless, means that they're able to stay in the workforce continuously. So, what does that mean for the wage gap? Are we seeing the wage gap between men and women narrow?

>> Shannon Seery:

Well, not exactly Jay, which was also a fairly interesting finding. So never married women still earn just about 92% of what never married men earn. And while the wage gap is narrower for single women than married women, it's been little changed over the past decade. So, in other words, it's moved within a narrow range. And there hasn't been much improvement since. This group, as you said, tends to be more likely to be childless. I think this therefore suggests there is much more to this argument than just this ‘mommy penalty’ that you mentioned. Right. So, there's also things like the tendency of women dominated jobs to pay less and the continuation of unconscious biases that cause this gap to persist.

>> Jay Bryson:

All right. Shannon. So Sarah, let’s take that we just talked about in terms of lower income among women than men, So does that also translate into lower wealth among women than men?

>> Sarah House:

Yes. So, it's really an uphill battle for single women to build wealth considering that they have lower income to the start. So, their expenses are largely the same. You still need a place to live, food, eat, health care. And we look at singles as a population as a whole. So, their median wealth is about $51,000, versus couples have a median wealth of $230,000. This is back in 2019. And couple's wealth is so much larger, in part because you have the benefits of married men's income. So, they have the highest income out of any marital group. And then also just the economies of scale of the two-person household. But if you look at single men versus single women, so single women in 2019, their median wealth was about 18% or $10,000 less than single men. And so, they're not really a huge factor here. So, women are about four times more likely to be single parents and those childcare costs and obligations can limit what jobs they can take, the hours they can work. And when you look at single mothers, their median wealth in 2019 was $7,000 versus about $65,000 for women with no dependent children. Now, that group skews a little bit older because they define children as financially dependent children. But even when we control for characteristics significant for wealth, like age, education, for example, the presence of children. So, the St. Louis Fed found that never married women's wealth is lower than never married men by about 29%. So, it’s the biggest wealth penalty amongst any marital group. So still pretty striking that you do have this lower wealth amongst these single women, particularly never married.

>> Jay Bryson:

Okay, so, in summary, single women have lower income than their male counterparts as well as lower wealth. So, Shannon, what sort of implications does that have for spending among unmarried women?

>> Shannon Seery:

Right. Jay. Well, with these lower dynamics for income and wealth, I think it's little surprise that single women also tend to spend less compared to single men or even the average U.S. household. So, they have seen comparable growth in spending over the past decade. So, the rate of single women spending growth has kept pace with broader spending trends. But I'd say that women tend to devote a higher share of spending towards necessities like housing and health care than their male counterparts. So, we've also seen an increase in terms of single women spending on education and food away from home specifically. So, we've seen their spending there grow even faster than men over the past decade. So, I think overall, while the higher share of single women in the United States isn't necessarily yet translating to outsized growth in spending, I still think that, you know, single women are a growing consumer segment, and we may see specific spending categories like education, food away from home, health care, potentially benefit from the continued rise in this population going forward.

>> Jay Bryson:

So, Sarah, let's end with thinking about the long term here. You know, up to this point, it's been more or less short-term, near-term sorts of things. What some of the longer-term effects of a growing share of single women in the economy.

>> Sarah House:

So, I think right now in terms of that greater propensity for single women to work, and particularly that growth in never married women. So that's great for labor force growth now, but the delay of marriage or forgoing it altogether, that's also associated with eventually having fewer children or lower fertility. And so, while we might be getting a near-term boost to labor force growth from single women, it does create challenges down the road in terms of that future labor supply growth. And perhaps on a more positive note, well, it hasn't translated to a narrower earnings gap yet. I think there's still the prospect that maybe we can see that gap narrower ahead as women's work experience more closely mirrors that of men. So, we've seen a gradual rise in the never married share of labor force through about 2010, but it's been more explosive since then. So, it might just be that it's still taking perhaps just a few years to see the payoff. So, you do have women's educational attainment growing faster. Corporations, I think are doing a lot to address what unconscious bias or unintended pay gaps exist. So, I think that could take time to show up in the data. But I think it will also depend on what happens to the relative earnings of women versus men dominated industries, which Shannon eluded to, is part of the reason that we're still seeing a pay gap between women and men of the same marital status. I think for now we have to bear in mind that the growing share of the population is generally in a more precarious financial position, though, so that can limit their spending. And even as this group is growing, it makes it hard to outpace other groups, even as they are getting more labor market experiences. And, that's going to have implications for businesses that have a large customer base of single women. It's great for their growing population, but it could be even a more powerful consumer segment if we did see some relative inroads in terms of income and wealth gaps.

>> Jay Bryson:

Well, thank you, sir, and thank you, Shannon. And thank you all for joining us today for our first installment of our Ask Our Economists podcast series, I'm Jay Bryson, and thank you very much.

>>Outro:

That’s all for this episode of the Ask Our Economists podcast and we thank you for joining us. If you enjoyed today’s episode, please share with colleagues, family, friends, and anyone who listens to podcasts. If you have any economic related questions or topics you would like to hear about in an upcoming episode, please email us at askoureconomists@wellsfargo.com. Ask our Economists is produced by Wells Fargo.

>>Disclosures:

This podcast should not be copied, distributed, published, or reproduced, in whole or in part.

The views expressed on this podcast represent the opinions of the authors on prospective trends in the domestic markets and the financial institutions industry and is intended for global financial institutions partners and customers, and other market participants who are customers of Wells Fargo. The views expressed within are not intended as a recommendation offer or solicitation with respect to the purchase or sale of any security or other financial product nor does it constitute professional advice. The views and opinions expressed are also not necessarily those of Wells Fargo and may differ from the views and opinions of other departments or divisions of Wells Fargo. Wells Fargo does not make any representation or warranty, express or implied, as to the accuracy or completeness of the statements or any information expressed within this podcast and any liability therefore (including in respect of direct, indirect, or consequential loss or damage) is expressly disclaimed.

We do not guarantee this information but have obtained it from sources we believe to be reliable. Opinions expressed are based on our experience and judgment as of this recording and are subject to change without notice. For the latest views of the Wells Fargo Economics team, please visit www.wellsfargo.com/cib/insights/economics.

This is not an offer to sell or to buy any security or foreign currency. Any past performance discussed during this podcast is no guarantee of future results. Any forward-looking statements or forecasts are based on assumptions and actual results may vary from any such statements or forecasts.

Any indices referenced  are for performance comparison are unmanaged and cannot be invested into directly. As always please remember investing involves risk and possible loss of principal capital; please seek advice from your licensed professionals.

All price references and market forecasts are as of the date of recording.

Wells Fargo Corporate & Investment Banking (CIB) and Wells Fargo Securities (WFS) are the trade names used for the corporate banking, capital markets, and investment banking services of Wells Fargo & Company and its subsidiaries, including but not limited to Wells Fargo Securities, LLC, member of NYSE, FINRA, NFA, and SIPC, Wells Fargo Prime Services, LLC, member of FINRA, NFA and SIPC, and Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., member NFA and swap dealer registered with the CFTC and security-based swap dealer registered with the SEC, member FDIC.  Wells Fargo Securities, LLC and Wells Fargo Prime Services, LLC, are distinct entities from affiliated banks and thrifts.